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discussed, but little subject to substantive comparative inquiry. In this thesis I utilize 
social movement theory to analyze the relation between Islamic revivalism and the global 
Salafi jihad in the Balkans. Comparing Bosnia and Bulgaria, I not only demonstrate the 
various manifestations of these phenomena but also argue for a differentiated case-by-
case approach when implementing the suggested analytical framework.  
I effectively show that the process of Islamic revivalism is mainly an imported 
phenomena maintained through the financial and ideological support from the Middle 
East. I also prove that there is no causal relationship between the Islamic revivalism and 
global Salafi jihad. Yet, the findings of the case studies caution against the possibility of 
structural and ideological convergence of the two phenomena that could effectively lead 
to the emergence of permissive environment for the spread of global Salafi jihad.  
I also argue that the current Islamic revival poses security threat to the region due 
to its potential of developing into viable Islamic movements on the ground. I conclude 
that to counter such security implications, the Balkan governments need to revisit their 
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Chief Mufti the head of the Islamic community in a Balkan state. Often it is also 
referred as reis-ul-ulema – in Arabic “the head of the clergy.” 
Madhab The word madhhab is derived from an Arabic word meaning "to go" 
or "to take as a way", and refers to a mujtahid's choice in regard to a 
number of interpretive possibilities in deriving the rule of Allah from 
the primary texts of the Qur'an and hadith on a particular question. In a 
larger sense, a madhhab represents the entire school of thought of a 
particular mujtahid Imam, such as Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shafi'i, or 
Ahmad--together with many first-rank scholars that came after each of 
these in their respective schools, who checked their evidences and 
refined and upgraded their work. 
Madrassa The word is used in Arabic in all the contexts that the word school is 
in English: for private, public and parochial schools, and for any 
elementary or secondary schools, whether Muslim, of other religions, 
or secular. 
Maktab elementary informal Islamic religious school 
Mjusjulmani in Bosnian – Muslims  
Mufti A mufti is an Islamic scholar who is an interpreter or expounder of 
Islamic law (Sharia), capable of issuing fataawa (plural of "fatwa”). 
Hence Chief Mufti – the head of the Islamic community in a Balkan 
state.  
mujahid  fighter (fighters). 
(pl. mujahidin) –  
umma umma is an Arabic word meaning community or nation. In the context 
of Islam, the word umma (often spelled ummah) is used to mean the 
community of the believers (ummat al-mu'minin), and thus the whole 
Islamic world. 
Waqf A waqf is a religious endowment in Islam, typically devoting a 
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I. INTRODUCTION, APPROACHING THE ISSUE OF ISLAMIC 
REVIVAL, AND DEFINING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
All through the twentieth century the modern world has wanted to bury 
religion at the level of an individual’s private life. Now, for some decades, 
one has seen a return in strength of ostentatious religions, which threaten 
the public space they occupy, break with the society they are in struggle 
against it. 
Farhad Khosrokhavar,  
Les Nouveaux Martyrs d’Allah, 2002 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The global revival of ethnic and religious identity at the end of the twentieth and 
the beginning of twenty-first century is a fact that has manifested itself in many ways, 
from the emergence of the Islamic republic of Iran, through the establishment of the first 
de facto Muslim country in Europe - Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, to the impact 
that it had on the 2004 presidential elections in the Unites States. Still, despite the 
resurgence of all religions, Islam has been in the center of the main debate, which, both in 
the West and in the Muslim world, has been circling around the contentious link1 
between Muslim religion and the surge of terrorist acts in the past decade.  
In this vein, the Madrid (03/11/2004) and London bombings (07/07/2005) not 
only led to further exploitation of such a possible link, but has also challenged the vitality 
of multiculturalism in Europe and put in question the viability of German, British and 
French models of integration of Muslims into the secular western societies.2 The 
November 2005 riots in France and parts of Germany showed the chasm between 
immigrant Muslims and the Europe’s mainstream societies. At the same time, the 
observed Islamic revival through the Internet and Middle Eastern satellite TV not only 
widened this gap but allowed for the radical activists to intimidate the large moderate  
 
                                                 
1 For an extreme example, see Shmuel Bar, “Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism,” Policy Review 
Online, available from www.policyreview.org/jun04/bar.html, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
2 Martin Walker, “Walker’s World: Europe’s Islamic Fears,” M&C News, November 7, 2005, 
http://news.monstersandcritics.com/europe/article_1060347.php/Walker%60s_World_Europe%60s_Islami
c_fears, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
1 
Muslim population in Europe.3 According to German polls conducted in the summer of 
2005, the majority of Muslims do not want to adapt to Western values, and one-third 
wants Islam to become state religion in every European country.4  
Not only do such facts confirm the increased importance of Europe as a 
battleground of the current “terror war,”5 but they also raise security concerns about the 
alleged growing threat of tiny minorities of homegrown extremists who have been drawn 
to the Islamist violence of Usama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.6  
In addition, the observed phenomena – Islamic revival and Global Salafi jihad, led 
to the recent re-emergence of the Balkans as a contested territory viewed by the West as a 
bridgehead in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) (in light with the current engagements 
in the Middle East) and, by the radical Islamists, as a gateway for Islamic penetration in 
Western Europe. The former is exemplified by the planned opening of three U.S. bases in 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2006 in addition to the strong European military presence in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The latter is demonstrated by the resurgence of Muslim religion 
through the spread of the Mosque Network and madrassas allegedly proselytizing 
Wahhabi Islam.  
B.  DEFINING THE PROBLEM – ISLAMIC EXTREMISM VS. ISLAMIC 
REVIVAL 
1.  Background  
While on the sidelines of some of the latest events, the Balkans has been affected 
for the last fifteen years by the same trends in Islamic resurgence that the EU recently 
started to pay attention to. The region has been in the focus of the terrorist experts and 
analysts since the early 1990s. In the face of initial lack of response by the international 
community (UN, OSCE and mainly the U.S.) to the 1992-1995 war in ex-Yugoslavia, not 
only was Al Qaeda provided with an opportunity to infiltrate the Balkans, but also the 
                                                 
3 Michael Taarnby, “The European Battleground,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 2, Issue 23, December 02, 
2004, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=400&issue_id=3161&article_id=2368947 , 
last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
4 Ibid.  
5 The term terror war has been suggested by Dr. John Arquilla at the Naval Postgraduate School 
during class discussions in December 2004 as one better encompassing the U.S.-led coalition 
counterterrorist efforts rather than the commonly used GWOT. 
6 For more information see Martin Walker’s “Walker’s World: Europe’s Islamic Fears,” in note 2 
above. 
2 
government of Bosnia and Herzegovina7 (henceforth Bosnia) had to revert and accept the 
overall assistance8 of the larger part of the Islamic world, namely Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
to secure its survival. Thus, the interplay of both internal (socio-economic, religious and 
identity crises) and external (spread of transnational advocacy network, Islamic activism 
and foreign threat) factors led to the resurfacing or reemergence of Islam in the region. 
These processes and developments have not been limited only to Bosnia. They have 
raised certain controversy and public debate in all Balkan states that have an indigenous 
Muslim population, namely Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Macedonia. In this respect, 
the current Islamic revival opens up the possibility of the resumption of the Balkans’ 
historical role as the gateway for the transmission of ideas, values, resources, and the 
spread of social networks from the Middle East. Nevertheless, the issue of Islamic revival 
has been either conflated with the threat of Islamic terrorism or viewed as an intrinsic 
part of the spread of the terrorist networks.  
The July 2004 report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States (known as the 9/11 commission) referred to the Balkans as “a region 
potentially vulnerable to terrorists due to significant Muslim populations and weak border 
controls and security services.”9 In addition, “many experts do not view the Balkans as a 
key region harboring or funding terrorists, at least when compared to the Middle East, 
North Africa, Southeast Asia, and Western Europe.”10 According to U.S. Army Major 
General Virgil Packett II, the former NATO commander of the multinational 
Stabilization Force in northeastern Bosnia, “With a 1,400 kilometer border, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was formerly a sanctuary for terrorism, but now it is a gateway for 
terrorism.”11  
 
                                                 
7 Throughout the thesis, all references to Bosnia actually refer to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
8 Slavejko Sasajkovski, “Political Islam” and Bosnia and Herzegovina,” New Balkan Politics no. 2 
(2001) http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/OldSite/Issue_2/sasajkovski.eng.asp, last accessed on 
October 13, 2005. 
9 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 
2004, 366-367, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
10 Steven Woehrel, “Islamic Terrorism and the Balkans,” Congressional Research Service Reports, 
July 26, 2005, 1, http://www.crsdocuments.com, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
11 Joel E. Starr, “How to Outflank al Qaeda in the Balkans,” European Affairs (Fall 2004). 
3 
The few local (emic) accounts often pushed forward by Serbian or Macedonian 
security experts view the Balkans and especially Bulgaria as “a springboard for terrorist 
operations in Western Europe” because of the key geostrategic position of the country 
through which the illegal traffic of drugs and weapons flows.12  
The prevalent political position emerging from the recent security seminar in 
Sofia attended by SACEUR Gen. James Jones does not differ considerably from the 
established U.S. and Western perceptions that view the greatest terrorist threat to the 
world as “the possibility of terrorists acquiring WMD.”13   
Nevertheless, the recent developments on the ground call for further elaborate 
analyses beyond the existing ones. On August 30, 2005, for the first time the leading 
Bosnian weekly magazine “Slobodna Bosna” (Free Bosnia), whose editor is Senad 
Avdic, a moderate Muslim, issued a report that claimed that terrorist training camps have 
been situated near the Jablanica and Boracko Lakes in Herzegovina, but later moved to 
another location: “At the beginning of August this year the Active Islamic Youth 
organized a big camp … apart from Active Islamic Youth, the Wahabi Islamic movement 
has been gathering strength in Bosnia.”14 In addition, on October 19, 2005, Bosnian 
police arrested a group that was planning to blow up the British embassy in Sarajevo.15 It 
turned out that the group had contacts with cells in Britain and Denmark where similar 
arrests ensued a week later. Of particular concern is the fact that despite the reports that 
the core of such Islamic militants has been the remained after 1992-1995 war foreign 
                                                 
12 “Serbian Experts: Bulgaria Is a Key Target for the Terrorists in the Region” [Сръбски експерти: 
България е ключова мишена за терористите в региона] (Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my 
own) netinfo.bg, November 23, 2005, http://news.netinfo.bg/index.phtml?tid=40&oid=805928, last 
accessed on October 13, 2005. 
13 “Bulgaria in the Reach of the Terrorist Organizations” [България в обсега на терористичните 
организации] SEGA (Internet edition), November 21, 2005, 
http://www.segabg.com/online/article.asp?issueid=2015&sectionid=2&id=0000202, last accessed on 
October 13, 2005. 
14 “Bosnia: Muslim Newspaper Points to the Existence of Islamic Terror Camps,” 
adnkronosinternational, August 30, 2005, 
http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level.php?cat=Security&loid=8.0.202217820&par=0, last accessed on 
October 13, 2005. 
15 “Terrorist Cells Find Foothold in Balkans: Arrests Point to Attacks within Europe,” Washington 
Post, December 1, 2005. 
4 
(predominantly) Afghan mujaheddins,16 for the first time two of the individuals involved 
in the plots are not only Bosnian citizens but also ethnic Bosnians – Bajro Ikanovic and 
Almir Bajric. 
Meanwhile, the brewing controversies among the local Islamic communities over 
allegations of spreading radical Islam started to acquire higher public profile. There had 
already been uneasy coexistence between the Islamic Zajednica (Islamic Community - 
IZ) in Bosnia and Active Islamic Youth (AIY) that basically led to some areas of the 
country effectively out of the control of those appointed by the IZ imams.17 In the case of 
Bulgaria, for the last several years (essentially since 2001), the Chief Mufti of the Muslim 
community in the country has been accused of turning the existing religious schools and 
mosques into centers for the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Starting in 2004, the 
Bulgarian media has often seized on the allegations of fundamentalism and the perceived 
threat from extremists, sparking an often-panicked public debate on the degree of Islamic 
influence in the country. The influential weekly Kapital, for example, recently published 
its own investigation into radical Islamism inside Bulgaria, alleging contacts between the 
office of the chief mufti and various Arabic organizations, and highlighting what it 
describes as a lack of transparency in the management of Muslim schools and 
institutions.18 
Against such a background, the need of operationalizing the observed Islamic 
revival by charting its manifestations, influences and projecting the possible socio-
cultural changes that it might or already has been inducing in the specific socio-cultural 
terrain in the Balkans search has become an issue of the highest security priority.  
                                                 
16 Here, I use the term in a way that connotes the Wikipedia definition: (Arabic: مجاهدين, also 
transliterated as mujāhidīn, mujahedeen, mujahedin, mujahidin, mujaheddin, etc.) is a plural form of 
mujahid (مجاهد), which literally means “struggler”, someone who engages in jihad, or “struggle”, but is often 
translated in the West as “holy warrior”. In the late twentieth century, the term “mujahedeen” became 
popular in the Western media to describe various armed fighters who subscribe to militant Islamic 
ideologies, although there is not always an explicit “holy” or “warrior” meaning within the word. For more 
see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mujaheddin, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
17 Ahmet Alibasi, “C-SIS Working paper No 2: Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,” Cambridge Security Programme, 2003, 21-22, http://www.cambridge-
security.net/pdf/alibasic.pdf, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
18 See Albena Shkodrova and Iva Roudnikova’s article, “Bulgaria: Investigation. Muslim Infighting 
Fuels Media Fundamentalist Fears,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) Balkan Crisis Report, 
No. 519, October 7, 2004, http://archiv2.medienhilfe.ch/News/2004/SEE/IWPR519.htm, last accessed on 
October 13, 2005. 
5 
C.  ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN THE BALKANS - RESEARCH QUESTIONS, 
WORKING HYPOTHESES AND PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 
1.  Research Questions 
In its attempt to decipher the trajectory and the security implications of the 
Islamic revival, this study embarks upon answering the following research question - 
does the observed process of Islamic revival (IR) in the Balkans pose a security threat to 
the region in the context of the rise of global Salafi jihad (GSJ)?  
This question puts forward two issues. First, it poses the problem of how the 
current phenomena should be operationalized in terms of its origins, scope, structural 
agents and social dynamic. Here, I suggest the implementation of an interdisciplinary 
approach having at its premises a social movement theory that allows for the 
interpretation of the Islamic revival in the context of the broader phenomena of Islamic 
activism.19 Second, the above question entails two subsidiary research questions which 
necessitate a relevant set of countermeasures - (a) does IR constitute the initial phase of 
the emergence of Islamic social movement dynamics on the ground, and (b) is there a 
causal relationship or other type of connection between the Islamic revival on the 
Balkans and the spread of Global Salafi jihad? 
2.  Working Hypotheses  
In this respect, the suggested interdisciplinary approach based on Social 
Movement Theory (SMT) will be used to test the following working hypotheses.  
First, the process of Islamic revival is mainly an imported (edic) phenomenon 
(H1). Second, the observed Islamic revival, depending on the characteristics of the social 
terrain20 in the different Balkan states, constitutes the initial phase of the emergence of 
local Islamic movements (H2). Third, there is no causal relationship between the Islamic 
revival and Global Salafi jihad (H3). Nevertheless, they share common organizational 
                                                 
19 Here I purposefully use the Quintan Wiktorowicz (Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory 
Approach, Indiana University Press, 2003) definition of Islamic activism as “the mobilization of contention 
to support Muslim causes,” (p. 2). Thus, it accommodates the variety of contentions that frequently emerge 
under the banner of “Islam,” including propagation movements, terrorist groups, collective action rooted in 
Islamic symbols and identities, explicitly political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state, and 
inward looking groups that promote Islamic spirituality through collective efforts.  
20 Defined by Steven Marks, Thomas Meer, and Matthew Nilson, Manhunting: A Methodology for 
Finding Persons of National Interest (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), social terrain 
refers to the “social elements that tie individuals together” (p. 73). 
6 
and ideological characteristics that provide a contingent link between the two 
phenomena. The categorization of such a contingent link as relational or non-relational 
depends on the level of social appropriation of the Islamic causes as a result of the 
Islamic revival developing some of the characteristics of local social movement. 
3.  Conclusions 
First, the process of the Islamic revival, though often conflated with the spread of 
the Global Salafi jihad, is a phenomenon qualitatively different from the latter one. 
Second, on the Balkans what is known as the international demonstration effect has a 
reverse dynamic. In most cases it links indigenous local movements, thus providing a 
global scene for their agenda which leads to international pressure that result in their 
socialization in the target state – something described as the Boomerang effect by Kick 
and Sikkink. Nevertheless, in the Balkans Islamic revival mainly constitutes an imported 
phenomenon, which through the spread of transnational advocacy networks such as the 
Mosque network, NGO and charities, provides mobilizing structures and religious 
framings that account for the emergence of certain social movement dynamics on the 
ground.  
Third, the main contention of this work is that the observed Islamic revival that 
relies on the above organizational agents does pose security threats to the regional and 
state security. Nevertheless, these threats are not only different from the ones directly 
associated with Islamic extremism, but also call for coordinated regional and state 
countermeasures that differ from the current ones.  
Depending on the case, such security threats can be briefly classified as follows: 
a. State with a Minority Muslim Population 
• Continuing isolation of minority religious population from the rest of the 
society thus allowing for the possible emergence of Islamic-based political 
parties that could jeopardize the social peace and create certain social 
movement dynamics that call for territorial changes or autonomy. 
• Such isolation allows for the provision of unfettered material support for 
GSJ through the established ITAN and mosque networks. This material 
support should be viewed more as a permissive environment for 
individuals that essentially constitute regional hubs for the GSJ network. 
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• Contentious dynamics between the different ethnic groups that can be used 
by neighboring states and internal and/or external actors to destabilize the 
region. 
b. State with a Majority Muslim Population 
• Social movement dynamics already developing on the ground mainly 
through youth organizations and informal groups.  
• Strong drive from material to moral support to GSJ. 
• Providing safe haven, logistic and recruitment base for the extremist or 
radical elements in order to mount or facilitate operations in Europe. 
D.  METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
1.  Methodology  
Comparative case study analysis is the methodology used in this study. Such a 
methodological approach will allow for exploring the issues against the specific socio-
cultural settings of the target states. For the purpose of this thesis, a somewhat artificial 
dichotomy is suggested between states with minority and majority Muslim population in 
order to provide better insights in terms of security indications and warnings, as well as 
policy recommendations.  
The primary case is the Islamic revival in Bosnia as a state that has a majority 
Muslim population and in which the current phenomena has been catalyzed by the 1992-
1995 war. The secondary case study is focused on Bulgaria, a state with a central 
geostrategic situation on the Balkans that often has been quoted as the “most successful 
ethnic model” in Europe.  
The findings of the case studies are based on open primary sources such as 
Congressional hearings, field studies, academic studies and national statistics. In addition, 
the author used both Western and local media publications, books, Internet articles, and 
web forums that provided for an emic perception of the issues on the ground. 
2. Building the Analytical Framework 
a. Current Analytical Approaches 
The first step in understanding why there is a need for a new approach and 
analytical framework to operationalize the current Islamic revival is to elaborate on some 
of the problems with the current one. Most of the recent analyses of the Balkans claim 
that the region poses major security concerns due to the developed “nexus among 
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terrorists, narcotics traffickers, weapons proliferators, and organized crime networks.”21 
These reports are based on information in periodicals and do not incorporate the issue of 
Islamic revival in their analytical framework.  
Another set of approaches has put the issue of the current Islamic revival 
in the context of the spread of Islamic terrorism and/or New Economy of Terror. This 
framework has been put forward by authors like Loretta Napoleoni, Yossef Bodansky 
and Stephen Schwarz.22 Though providing some general insights, these authors interpret 
the spread of the agents of Islamic revival such as the Mosque Network and faith-based 
NGOs as part of the terror network or Islamic economics. Even the recent Congressional 
hearing, in addition to the demonstrated underestimation of the problem, has also lumped 
together an Islamic youth organization in Bosnia with Al Qaeda. The problem with such 
an approach is that it lumps Islamic revival with Islamic extremism and it necessarily 
treats the Islamic resurgence as serving a self-fulfilling role of spreading the terror 
networks and promoting terrorism.  
As a counterpoint to the above approaches, Michael Innes (2004) argued 
that a model of terrorism and terrorist sanctuaries rooted in post-9/11 strategic thought 
and the global war on terror (GWOT) is inadequate to the study of terrorism in Bosnia 
and the Balkans.23 He raised concerns about the danger of overreaction of the local 
governments to Islamic activism. On the other hand, Innes also drew attention to the 
emergence of local Islamic groups that do not necessarily have the same agenda like the 
offshoots of Muslim Brotherhood in the region, for example. Nevertheless, despite the  
 
                                                 
21 Glenn Curtis and Tara Karacan, The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons 
Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe, A Study Prepared by the Federal 
Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the United States 
Governments, 2002. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/WestEurope_NEXUS.pdf, last accessed on 
October 13, 2005. 
22 Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollar Behind the Terror Networks, (Seven 
Stories Press, 2005), Yossef Bodansky; Target the West: Terrorism in the World Today, (S.P.I. Books, 
1993) and “The Price of Washington’s Bosnia Policy,” Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, 1998, 
http://www.freeman.org/m_online/feb98/bodansky.htm, last accessed on October 13, 2005 and Stephen 
Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and Its Role in Terrorism, (Anchor, 2003). 
23 Michael Innes, “Terrorist Sanctuary and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Challenging Conventional 
Assumptions,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 28, (2005) 295, 
http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/pgkkumqqumq9a1t79trn/contributions/n/3/6/k/n36k32x53kn4
r324.pdf, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
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fact that he calls for better understanding of the local socio-cultural and ethnic 
characteristics of the region, his analysis still views them in relation to the spread of 
international terrorism.  
Some of the recent academic works using SNA24 (Social Network 
Analysis) and Nexus Topography25 have been aimed at operationalizing the current 
Global Salafi jihad26 and Islamic activism, thus mapping the social terrain in which these 
phenomena thrive. Though not specifically addressing the issue of Islamic revival, these 
studies provide valuable insights into some of the social dynamics on the ground by 
offering an analysis of the “weak links,” cliques, and embedding of the terror networks in 
certain socio-cultural settings. Nevertheless, these studies do not incorporate the Balkans 
as part of their analysis and have not been aimed at operationalizing the Islamic revival in 
the region in relation to the spread of GSJ.  
The issue of Islamic revival as such has been of academic interest mainly 
in line with the emergence of Islamic social movements in the Middle East and North 
Africa in the last decades of the twentieth century.27 Nevertheless, to a certain extent, the 
current phenomenon witnessed in the Balkans follows its own trajectory that is different 
from the one in the Middle East. Certainly, the revivalist traditions of the latter have as its 
foundation several conceptualizations involving the terms tajdid (regeneration, renewal), 
takfir (calling someone an unbeliever, even Muslims), jihad, and transformation of 
concepts like jahiliyyah and tawhid.28 Yet, the current dynamics and trends in the 
Balkans are contextually different from those described above. 
                                                 
24 For more information see Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2004). 
25 Steven Marks, Thomas Meer, and Matthew Nilson, Manhunting: A Methodology for Finding 
Persons of National Interest (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005). 
26 This thesis uses Marc Sageman’s (2004) definition of Global Salafi jihad: “It is not a specific 
organization, but a social movement consisting of a set of more or less formal organizations, linked in 
patterns of interaction …Participants in the global Salafi jihad are not atomized individuals but actors 
linked to each other through complex webs of direct and mediated exchanges,” (p. 137).  
27 For more see Carrie Rosefsky, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in 
Egypt, (Columbia University Press, New York, 2004) and Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam (Columbia, 
University Press, New York, 2005). 
28 For further discussion, see John Obert Voll, “The Revivalist Heritage,” in The Contemporary 
Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and Bibliography by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, John Obert Voll, and 
John L. Esposito (with Kathleen Moore and David Sawan), (Greenwoood Press, CT, 1991), 24-31. 
10 
b. Balkans Specifics  
First, the embedded heterogeneous Muslim minorities have either Slavic 
(that converted to Islam) or Turkish origins. For the last fifteen years such a 
differentiation determined the scope, sources and target groups of Islamic activism, one 
inspired through the Middle Eastern (Islamic) influence aimed at the Slavic Muslim 
minority, while the other had to do more with Pan-Turkism.  
Second, the endemic problems of corruption and lack of strict rule of law 
(more endemic in the Western Balkans) are exacerbated by the often Islam phobic 
authorities and/or general public perceptions. The latter has to do with the strong societal 
memories of almost 500 years of Turkish rule in the Balkans. Such manifestations have 
led to strong chauvinistic sentiments in ex-Yugoslavia under Milosevic. Thus, the rise of 
nationalism has been further catalyzed by the still prevalent perception of the religion as a 
form of identity in the Balkans, a factor that also accounts for the emergence of a new 
state in the region – Bosnia. Another consequence of such historically predisposed 
sentiments is also the destructive potential they have for the national security as they lend 
themselves to any manipulative attempts to interpret social or ethnic conflicts as religious 
ones. The 2005 Parliamentary elections in Bulgaria provide the most recent example as 
the newly founded party “Ataka” (Attack) with an outright chauvinistic political platform 
won several seats in the National Assembly.  
Third, there has been strong U.S. influence in the Balkans that not only led 
to the involvement of several Balkan states in Iraq (Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, and Romania), but also made it necessary for the local governments to adopt 
more or less the U.S. vision and strategy for the global war on terror. Without getting into 
the details of the latter, it is suffice to note that in combination with the lack of 
comprehensive EU policy towards Muslim minorities,29 local governments are left 
without a comprehensive strategy for the emerging issues at home. In reference to the 
latter, the influx of immigrants (legal and illegal) from the Middle East and the gloomy 
economic situation in most of the states in the region has been creating further security  
 
                                                  
29 As the demonstrations of November 2005 in France, Belgium and Germany have shown. 
11 
challenges. Thus, the current security measures are focused on border control, etc, but 
rarely backed up by any comprehensive measures within the state that account for the 
social dynamics. 
c. Analytical Framework 
This thesis is focused on researching the phenomenon of Islamic revival 
(IR) in relation to the global Salafi jihad (GSJ) and establishing a possible causal or other 
connection between them. In pursuit of an answer to the stated research questions and in 
terms of testing the working hypotheses, the author suggests an analytical framework 
based on a multidisciplinary approach built upon the social movement theory (SMT) and 
relevant anthropological studies.  
Though there has been no sufficiently coherent body of theory concerning 
social movements, social movement theory (SMT), as pointed out by Robinson (2004), 
has emerged as a sort of middle ground approach in analyzing episodes of contentious 
collective actions, falling between structuralist and rational choice schools.30 What is 
important for the purpose of this thesis is that both phenomena at stake can be analyzed 
as part of a bigger one, termed as “Islamic activism.”31 Here, the author uses 
Wiktorowicz’s (2004) definition of the latter as being “the mobilization of contention to 
support Muslim causes.”32 Such a broad definition allows for the accommodation of the 
variety of contention that emerges under the banner of “Islam,” including propagation 
movements, terrorist groups, and collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and 
identities, explicitly political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state, and 
inward-looking groups that promote Islamic spirituality through collective action.33 
Using the Islamic activism as an overlapping phenomenon that transcends the specificity 
of “Islam” as being a system of meaning, identity, and basis of collective action allows 
both phenomena at stake to be analyzed along a continuum on which IR and GSJ can be 
pictured at the extreme opposite sides (as depicted in Figure 1). 
                                                 
30 Wiktorowicz, 113.  






Figure 1.   Analytical Framework 
 
13 
Such an interpretation of the Islamic revival through SMT lenses provides 
a common analytical framework that can be used to test all three working hypotheses. 
Below I argue that though the interplay of all three factors (meaning, identity, and 
collective action) is inherent to the process of Islamic activism, the current empirical 
evidence has it that action has been the leading factor defining GSJ, while for the process 
of IR I build the case that such a factor is identity shift.  
In reference to the former, Marc Sageman (2004) and Jason Burke (2003) 
have already tried to successfully operationalize the evolution of Al Qaeda, in particular, 
and global Salafi jihad, in general, on the premises that they have evolved into a global 
religious revivalist movement. According to Sageman (2004), global Salafi jihad is a 
worldwide religious revivalist movement with the goal of reestablishing past Muslim 
glory in a great Islamist state stretching from Morocco to the Philippines, eliminating 
present national boundaries.34 Such a definition also dovetails with the conclusion put 
forward by Jason Burke (2003):  
We are now in the third phase, where ‘al-Qaeda’, neither a vanguard nor a 
base, is instead accurately characterized by the third translation I outlined: 
the methodology, the maxim, the precept, the rule, the way of seeing the 
world. The ‘hardcore’ is scattered, the ‘network of networks’ broken up. 
All that remains is the idea of ‘al-Qaeda’. You are a member of al-Qaeda 
if you say you are.35 
Of particular interest for the purpose of this thesis are Sageman’s findings 
about the process of joining jihad, specifically the importance of social bonds. Evaluating 
the results of his study against the Lofland-Stark theory, he puts forward a three-prong 
process of joining the jihad: 
• Social affiliation with the jihad through friendship, kinship, and 
discipleship. 
• Progressive intensification of beliefs and faith leading to acceptance of the 
Global Salafi jihad ideology. 
• Formal acceptance to the jihad through the encounter of a link to the jihad. 
                                                 
34 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2004), 
1. 
35 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: I. B. Tauris and Co Ltd., 2004), 
290.  
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Sageman (2004) confirms his conclusions by pointing out that “Social 
bonds are the critical element in the process (of becoming mujahed) and precede 
ideological commitment. These bonds facilitate the process of joining through mutual and 
social support, development of common identity, and encouragement to adopt new 
faith.”36 Still, the main caveat to these findings is that these factors are internal to the 
group, thus they, by necessity, have a group dynamic. This is an important distinction 
characteristic of GSJ from the Islamic revival.   
The issue of Islamic revival poses a greater challenge in terms of 
operationalizing it in the context of specific historic and social settings in the Balkans. 
SMT has been mainly concerned with already established social movements whose actors 
and contentious frames have been analyzed against the changes in the structure of 
political opportunities. The Islamic revival does not have the mobilization and 
contentious dynamics of a full-fledged movement, yet the author’s contention is that it 
has a powerful potential of evolving into one. Before offering an analytical framework 
that would explore whether IR constitutes the initial stage of the emergence of the Islamic 
social movement, a brief quest for its definition is due.  
According to Charles Tilly (2004), “a social movement is a ‘sustained, 
organized public effort making collective claims at target authorities’ that uses a well-
hewn contentious repertoire on the part of people who proclaim themselves to be worthy, 
unified, numerous, and committed.”37 For Tarrow (1998), Islamic fundamentalism is a 
third [transnational social movement] even if it appears to take different forms in 
different parts of the world, from Afghanistani Taliban to Iranian nationalism to the 
Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (citing Eickelman 1997; Kane 1997).38 
The term Islamic revival has often been used by some scholars as 
interchangeable with Islamic fundamentalism. The latter use in this regard does not 
connote the pejorative meaning that the term fundamentalism acquired after the Iranian 
revolution. In this respect, Islamic revivalism for the purpose of this thesis will be viewed 
                                                 
36 Sageman, 135. 
37 Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004 (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), 3-5. 
38 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 185. 
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in terms of Islamic awakening and returning to the tenets and fundamentals of Islam. In 
itself such a definition accounts for an increased manifestation of Islamic practices and 
their stricter observance. In line with such an assumption, Asef Bayat (1998) suggested 
that the Islamic revival be viewed as the spread of (a) the institutions of Islam as general, 
such as mosques, Ulama, Islamic relief foundations, charities and NGOs, religious 
schools, (b) the Islamic proselytisation, in the form of Islamic literature, audio and video 
tapes, radio and TV, printed media, and (c) the growth of religiosity in society as a 
whole.39 To a certain extent, Ahmet Alibasi (2003) used this framework and suggested 
that the current Islamic revival in Bosnia be analyzed through its manifestations as 
follows:40 
• (Re)construction of mosques finance by local and foreign money  
• (Re)opening of new education institutions  
• Publishing of Islamic texts and periodicals 
• Intensified personal religiosity and use of Islamic social symbols (mosque 
attendance, hijab for women, and beard for men) 
• Establishment of Muslim political organizations  
• Emergence of Muslim solidarity organizations 
Such a view of the Islamic revival that focuses on the manifestations does 
not necessarily account for changes. In this study, I argue that the process of Islamic 
revival viewed in the greater context of Islamic activism should also be analyzed in terms 
of dynamic change of social relations and identity. The latter should be understood as an 
individual or group identification with the tenets (fundamentals) of Islam that entail not 
only stricter observation of the religious duties but also increased role of Islamic 
principles as pertaining to the group behavior and/or practices. 
Thus, the above described static and process approach will be used 
specifically for the suggested case studies. I use Bayat’s approach as instrumental in 
grasping the current scope and parameters of the Islamic revival. Such an analysis will 
also provide insights into the structural agents of the current Islamic revival. More 
                                                 
39 Here, I use the framework suggested by Asef Bayat in “Revolution without Movement, Movement 
without Revolution: Comparing Islamist Activism in Iran and Egypt”, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, vol. 40, no. 1, January 1998; and Ahmet Alibasi in “Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,” as cited in note 17.  
40 Alibasi, 14.  
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important, it will account for the supply and demand side of the phenomenon, and thus 
operationalize the Islamic revival in terms of whether it is an external (edic) or internal 
(edic).  
For the purpose of analyzing the possible identity and social group 
dynamic changes, I will revert to the use of anthropological analyses based on conducted 
field studies. Such an approach is also aimed at providing background to what extent 
radical Islam has gained support among the populace at the expense of the traditional folk 
Islam. Both analytical approaches as integrated in the bigger analytical framework will 
allow for early delineation between the process of Islamic revival and Islamization – the 
former being a “demand” side issue while the latter a “supply” side.  
Thus, the first tier of the suggested analytical framework will be the static 
and process approach backed by anthropological analysis of the possible social changes 
in the Muslim population on the Balkans. At tier two I will use the above suggested 
analytical framework centered upon SMT theory against which the hypotheses of the 
thesis will be tested. 
For testing the hypotheses of the IR being the first stage of the emergence 
of SM, this study suggests the use of the analytical framework of Doug McAdam as 
depicted on the left side of Figure 1. Such a framework was put forward by McAdam in 
order to “understand how movement has developed initially and then spread beyond its 
local origins.” It is worth noting that Sageman’s and McAdam’s approach have certain 
overlaps. Nevertheless, they have different goals, as Sageman’s purpose is to 
operationalize the spread of GSJ as a revivalist social movement while McAdam’s is to 
try to discern how a movement emerges and develops. In this respect, the latter analytical 
approach is best suitable for testing the possible evolution of IR into an Islamic social 
movement. 
In terms of the probable link between GSJ and IR, this study suggest a 
closer look at the common structural and organizational elements through which both 
phenomena allegedly thrive in the region –  the Mosque network, faith-based NGOs, 
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Islamic schools and social hubs.41 Their role and impact will be viewed in the context of 
the spread of the Islamic transnational advocacy network. My contention is that they are 
not different in terms of their manifestations and dynamics from the other transnational 
advocacy networks (TAN) as described by Kick and Sikkink. Kick and Sikkink’s insights 
about the TAN allow for (a) determining whether IR is an emic or edic phenomena, and 
(b) allow for investigating the possible link between IR and GSJ through these common 
structures. In relevance to the former I will use the Boomerang approach to test (a), while 
to the latter (b) the ITAN analytical framework will be implemented.  
In regard to the above, ITAN will be viewed in the context of SM but still 
having their own dynamic and characteristics. Social movements are only one form along 
a spectrum of contention, as NGOs, labor movements, transnational coalitions, and 
elements of international institutions are important actors, even if their actions are not 
obviously ‘social movement’ actions,42 Nevertheless, the SMT approach should not be 
overestimated and accepted as universal. Thus it is important to point out that preliminary 
research shows that IR falls short of being a movement. “The conditions necessary to 
produce a sustained social movement that is, at once, integrated within several societies, 
unifies in its goals and organization, and capable of mounting contention against a variety 
of targets are hard to fulfill.”43 In this respect, it is worth building on Tarrow’s 
framework of internationalism44 and linking it to the networks of informal ties among 
NGOs and advocacy networks in transnational systems of migration, crime, contraband, 
religious activism and political activism.  
In this respect it is worth delving into the role and importance of the 
transnational institutions and through their spread to analyze the current revivalist trends 
and possible future developments. As Tarrow pointed out, “Islamic fundamentalism grew 
up within one of the oldest transnational institutions in the world, with autonomous 
                                                 
41 Here, I suggest Mark Sageman’s (2004) definition of a regional hub: “Some nodes are more popular 
and are attached to more links, connecting them to other more isolated nodes. These more connected nodes, 
called hubs, are important components of a terrorist network,” (p. 137).  
42 Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
7. 
43 Ibid., 8. 
44 Ibid. 
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religious schools, mosques, and sects all over the world in which to root itself.”45 His 
approach will be central to the analysis of the findings of the case studies, thus exploring 
the (un)charted influence and dynamics of transnational advocacy.  Tarrow’s approach 
will also be implemented in combination with Keck and Sikkink’s Boomerang model.  
Here, I suggest a slightly different approach when operationalizing the 
role of ITAN. While Tarrow views these institutions as conduits of rapid cross-border 
diffusion of domestic contention, I want to turn this notion around and analyze the effects 
of these transnational advocacy networks on the local populace and domestic actors.  
In this respect, transnational advocacy networks (TAN) are defined as 
follows: “A transnational advocacy network includes those relevant actors working 
internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common 
discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.”46 Keck and Sikkink, point 
out that the difference between SM and TAN is the social networks, as “TAN are 
connective structures that cross national boundaries, whereas social networks are the 
bases for contentious politics within domestic societies.”47 
Also “TAN lack the drama, the deliberate contentiousness, and the broad 
goals of such transnational movements as … fundamental Islam.”48 Therefore, through 
the case studies the thesis will test whether the spread of TAN as faith-based foundations 
represents the fore post for the spread of radical Islam as a social movement, and whether 
Islamic revival is part of the same process. In addition to Tarrow, Keck and Sikkink 
looked at the networking and “their boomerang effect” through its positive impacts. In 
this respect I will use the following conclusions they came up with:49 the role in “the 
socialization of new movements within national states” and that TAN resemble SM in 
their attempts to both place new issues on the agenda and make them resonant with 
indigenous cultural understanding. 
                                                 
45 Tarrow, 8. 
46 Tarrow, 7. 
47 Ibid., 188. 
48 Ibid., 189. 
49 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders, Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) as quoted in Tarrow, 189. 
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In the case of the Balkans, the problem identified with TAN (unlike 
domestic movements different parts of TAN need to appeal to belief systems, life worlds, 
and stories, myths and folk tales in many different countries and cultures) seems to 
actually be a common theme and base for infiltration for the faith-based TAN. In 
addition, the exchange of information and services also includes influence and impact of 
edic ideas and individuals.  
E.  PLAN OF THE STUDY  
Chapters II and III operationalize the observed Islamic revival respectively in 
Bosnia and Bulgaria. I first provide an historical and social account of the evolution of 
the Islamic religion in these Balkan states. Furthermore, a static approach based on the 
manifestations of the Islamic revival is used in order to evaluate the scope and character 
of the current phenomenon. Once the parameters of the latter are established, I then 
embark on identifying the changes in the social relations and practices in the Muslim 
communities in the target states. In this respect, these chapters will test the first and the 
second of the working hypotheses. In addition, both case studies will provide the 
necessary background for the implementation of the analytical model in order to test the 
third working hypothesis that addresses the possible structural and ideological link 
between IR and GSJ.  
Chapter IV tests the analytical model against the findings of the case studies. In 
addition, it contends to establish the differences and similarities between Bosnia and 
Bulgaria in regard to the researched phenomena. 
In Chapter V, I review the findings of the study and assess the validity of 
alternative hypotheses. In this regard, chapter V discusses possible security and policy 
implications and initiative, both at the national and regional level that derive from the 
findings of this study. I also highlight several indications and warning factors that may 
provide for future security considerations. Finally, the chapter points to several areas of 
further inquiry that may broaden the understanding of Islamic revival in the context of 
GSJ. 
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II. CASE STUDY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
A.  ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN THE BALKANS – HISTORIC RETROSPECTIVE 
In this chapter, I first use a static approach and outline the current scope and 
manifestations of the observed Islamic revival. This revival is the spread of the 
institutions of Islam as general, such as mosques, Islamic relief foundations, charities and 
NGOs, religious schools, Islamic books, brochures, and tapes publishing, as well as the 
growth of religiosity in society as a whole.  
The comparative historic analysis allows me to test the first hypothesis dealing 
with the sources and agents of the IR in Bosnia. I show that (a) the process of Islamic 
revival had not started in the early 1990s – on the contrary, it has its roots in the 
beginning of the twentieth century and, though it was spurred mainly by the Serbo-
Croatian threat perception, from the outset it had been unique to the emic (internal) 
phenomenon of the Balkans that is inseparable from the building of Bosnian national 
identity; (b) the Islamists “hijacked” the Islamic revival in the beginning of 1990 while 
the real driving force behind it in the 1960s and 1970s had been the Sufi orders and 
traditional ulema; (c) though empirically it seems that the same process of Islamic revival 
received a “second wind” in the 1990s, I would argue that the organizational agents, 
structures and sources of the revival had shifted once the goals of the emic revival were 
achieved through the formation of Bosnian state and nation, and now the current 
manifestations of the phenomena emanate from external and/or transnational sources.  
In the second section of this chapter I build upon the presented findings in the first 
section and embark on verifying the second hypothesis by testing whether the observed 
IR is in an initial phase and/or has advanced to have the characteristics of an emerging 
social movement. The thesis posits that, while the current evidence is insufficient to 
confirm the hypothesis, the social appropriation of the radical Salafi ideas and the 
existence of powerful cultural mobilization frames transformed Bosnia into a contested 
ground between the foreign religious organizations and the incumbent IC. Finally, I argue 
that the evolution of the local youth organizations against such a background has the 
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potential of evolving into powerful social movements on the ground tied to the issue of 
renewed nationalism, refugee return and current governmental policy inadequacies.  
1. Religion, Ethnicity and Nationhood – The Making of a Muslim State 
in Bosnia  
The Balkans are home to over six million Muslims—making up 70 percent of 
Albania’s population, 40 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s, 17 percent of Macedonia’s, 
and 19 percent of Serbia and Montenegro’s.50 Bosnia and Herzegovina marks the 
Western expansion of the boundaries of the Muslim world. In contrast to Western 
Europe, the Muslim population is largely indigenous. The Bosnians converted to Islam in 
the middle of the fifteenth century en masse, the only example of a near-total acceptance 
of the Muslim religion in the Balkans. Though there have been several explanations of it, 
it seems the most valid one is that the Christian religion had not caught with the local 
populace due to the strong Bogomil movement in the twelfth century.51 In terms of 
religious practices, Bosnia adopted the predominant in the Turkish Empire Hanafi 
madhab of Islam. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory is divided into two entities, the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation) and the Republika Srpska (RS), with a separate 
administrative district in Brcko. Bosnia has an area of 19,781 square miles. In June 2004, 
the State Agency for Statistics estimated that the population was around 3.8 million,52 
although a reliable census has not been conducted since 1991. Relevant statistics on the 
precise membership of different religious groups remain unavailable.  
According to the U.N. Development Program's Human Development Report in 
2002 cited by the US Department of State,53 Muslims constitute 40 percent of the 
                                                 
50 All percentages derived from the Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 2005, 
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
51 Long disputed over by its ring of more powerful neighbours, Bosnia was not yet firmly integrated 
into any ecclesiastical body when the Bogomil movement was expelled from Byzantium and Bulgaria, and 
then spread westwards. Bosnia became under its bans (rulers alike kings) a refuge for persecuted heretics. 
Ban Kulin (c. 1180-1204) and his successors all appear to have been favorable to, or at least tolerant of, this 
popular movement. For more, see The Balkan Slavs: Bosnia and the Bogimil Heresy, 
http://www.serbianna.com/features/entry_of_slavs/bosnia.shtml, last accessed on October 13, 2005.  
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population, Serb Orthodox 31 percent, Roman Catholics 15 percent, Protestants 4 
percent, and other groups 10 percent. The small Jewish community has approximately 
1,000 believers and maintains a special place in society by virtue of its long history of 
coexistence with other religious communities and its active role in mediating among 
those communities.  
The evolution of a national identity in Bosnia shares many common traits with 
that of Serbs and Croats, but as Velikonja (2003) pointed out, “it is distinguished from 
them by the significance of the religious [Muslim] factor.”54 
Thus, it is imperative to view the process of Islamic revival in the context of a 
historical evolution and building of Bosnian Muslim national identity. Thus, the thesis 
offers a somewhat artificial periodization of Bosnian history into the pre-1991 era (before 
the collapse of Yugoslavia), and post-1991 period with an emphasis on the 1991-1995 
war and its consequences.  
There are several characteristics of the evolution of Islam in Bosnia in this period. 
First, for the past 150 years, Bosnian Muslim national identity was forged within a 
framework which highlighted foreign threats in the context of the hostile environment 
imposed by the neighboring Croats and Serbs. Second, there had been up until 1991 a 
tenuous link between the reis-ul-ulema and other authorities and the genuine religious 
leaders. Finally, there has been an Islamic revival within the mainstream of “folk Hanafi 
Islam” that, nevertheless, has to be viewed in the ethnic-nationalistic framework that led 
to the affirmation of Bosnian nationality against the competing Serbian and Croatian 
churches.  
The framing of a foreign threat is important to understanding the development of 
a Muslim identity in Bosnia. A multi-religious mix of the country added an important and 
particular factor to the history of the identity in the country.55 Though both Serbian and 
Croatian ethno-religious extremism and national policy did not support Bosnian national 
self-affirmation until the late 1960s,56 the breaking point for the Muslims in ex-
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Yugoslavia was 1971, when the then national census offered them the opportunity to 
declare themselves Muslim in the national sense. Thus, this confusion made many believe 
that Islam was a nationality or a nation.  
Nevertheless, while Serbian and Croatian churches were taking advantage of the 
liberalization of the communist methods and expanding their resources, a Muslim 
religious organization had not been established as a guardian of national identity.57 After 
World War II (WWII), the Muslim religious organization (the Islamic religious 
community, later renamed into Islamic Community) rebuilt itself in socialist Yugoslavia. 
As Perica pointed out, in the early 1980s the Islamic community (IC)58 was an 
organization of Muslim clerical and lay officials headquartered in Sarajevo, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.59 During the communist era, the unified Muslim religious organization was 
established in all six Yugoslav Republics and two provinces. After the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Muslim religious organization was abolished and the 
autonomous Islamic Community of Bosnia was founded in Sarajevo.  
Central to the purpose of this thesis is the development, dynamic and emerging 
frictions within the Muslim community in Bosnia after February 1968 when the Central 
Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared Bosnian 
Muslims, as well as other Yugoslav Muslims who thought of themselves as a distinct 
nationality, a full-fledged nationality recognized by the federal constitution. 
Thus, here I argue that before 1991 there was a genuine Islamic revival in Bosnia 
which was promoted and had as its organizational agents the IC, which provided the 
institutional framework, the Sufi orders that commanded traditional support mainly in the 
countryside (from below, bottom-up), and the extreme Young Muslim group (led by Alija 
Izetbegovic) which professed mainly Islamist ideas but had until 1991 constituted only an 
intellectual minority (from above, top-down). The roots of such a revival can be found in 
the 1920s, though it was stalled for couple of decades with the institutionalizing of 
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Importantly, Bosnian Muslims throughout the twentieth century have not been cut 
off from the great changes that swept over the greater Islamic world. Even in the 
beginning of the twenty-first century in the case of the Muslim population of 
contemporary Bosnia, it can be seen what Tarrow (1998) terms as “cross-border 
diffusion—the communication of movement ideas, forms of organization, or challenges 
to similar targets from one center of contention [Egypt] to another.”60 Still, these ideas 
seemed to catch up more with the traditional ulema than the leadership of the IZ. Since 
the “proclamation” of the new nation there has been friction between Muslims who 
stressed ethnicity and modern secular national identity, and Muslims who considered 
religion the key ingredient of ethnic nationalism.61 The former was emphasized by the IZ 
while the latter by the outlawed Young Muslims. Such a controversy led to the change of 
IZ head in 1989 and in the formation of Izetbegovich’s party SDA (Party of Democratic 
Action) on May 26. 1990.62 In addition, as I will show in section two, these fissures 
proved to be crucial in the emergence of extreme interpretations (as Wahhabism) of Islam 
in the mid-1990s along with the predominantly Hanafi (folk) Islamic tradition.  
IZ had been the closest supporter of the regime’s official ideology of 
“brotherhood and unity” and was instrumental in backing the Titoist foreign policy of 
non-alignment. Such support played a crucial role in the rebuilding and expansion of 
Islam in the 1960s and 1970s when the Yugoslav government embarked on liberal 
reforms. The figures are illustrative. Between 1969 and 1980, more than 800 Muslim 
places of worship had been built, and the IZ operated over 3,000 mosques in early 
1980.63 In the first half of the 1980s, IZ had 1,600 officials – imams, hafezs (reciters of 
the Qur’an), religious instructors and other employees.64 In addition, the Muslim 
religious organization had the most favorable cleric-per-believer ratio among the three 
major religions in Yugoslavia – one imam for every 1,250 Muslims. The IZ had not been 
enjoying only state support but abundant financing from Islamic countries. While the 
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extreme elements (such as Hasan Cengic – a close fellow to Izetbegovic) were contained 
during this period, some of them were able to voice their complaints that “Islam was 
suppressed in Yugoslavia.”65 According to Kepel, between the 1970s and the 1990s, 
Islamists remained an intellectual minority.66 He explained this phenomenon in using the 
framework of resource mobilization theory and arguing that there was no other social 
groups liable to join it to resemble a movement like the ones in Egypt, Pakistan, or 
Malaysia, and there was no devout middle class nor an impoverished urban youth with 
the potential to unite.67 Still, my argument here is that the Islamists “hijacked” the 
Islamic revival in the beginning of 1990 while the real driving force behind such a revival 
in the 1960s and 1970s had been the Sufi orders and traditional ulema.  
Historically, Sufi orders played an important role in the islamisation of Bosnia, 
the Osmanli military, and revolts against the Osmanli state. Sufis were successful 
propagators of Islam due to their accommodation of some local customs and practices. 
The IC put a ban on the tariqas in 195268 and it was not until 1990 when the situation 
started to improve. Nevertheless, it did not mean that the Sufi orders stopped their 
activity. Their main concentration is in Central Bosnia (Travnik, Foijnica, Kiseljak, 
Visoko, Zenica, and Sarajevo) and their actions soon accounted for the reinforcement of 
the traditional fissures between the urban and rural elites in Bosnia. On the other hand, 
the growing numbers of youths sent to the Arab states for the purpose of religious 
education upon return either joined Izetbegovic’s side or veered towards the anti-
communist clergy. In this respect, Sadowski showed that the “traditionalism” as a variety 
of political Islam caught up with the rural elites while reformism was in the realm of 
senior ulema and the nontraditional urban elites. Ahmet Alibasi69 confirmed these 
fissures. In his working paper, he showed that Bosnians accepted Islam on “the hands of 
the Osmanli ‘ulama and Sufis and therefore adopted the dominant legal and theological 
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schools in the state, Hanafi madhab in law and Maturidi school70 of thought in theology. 
The position of these two schools remained practically unchallenged until the recent 
internecine conflict in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. The exception is modernism 
which was quite strong during 1960s and 1970s. However, it was confined to small 
Islamic intellectual circles in Sarajevo, a few Islamic publications and the classrooms of 
the Faculty of Islamic studies without stronger roots in Muslim population.”71  
These divisions came forward with the death of Tito that led to a backlash against 
Izetbegovic in the infamous trial of 1983, when he and his supporter were sentenced to a 
combined total of 90 years in jail. Such an act of political repression, due mainly to the 
Serbian fears of the increased Islamic revival, ensued further discrediting of the IZ72 as 
the authorities tried to involve them in the political struggles, raised the profile of 
Bosnian Islam in the Arab and Iranian media, and led to the growing popularity of 
Izetbegovic and his increasing influence among the Bosnian Muslim Clergy. It was only 
a question of time when it would throw its lot with him. Such a time came in the late 
1980s and beginning of the 1990s when Serbian and Croatian ethnic nationalist 
movements swamped Yugoslavia, i.e. in the face of the internal and external threat. Both 
the magazine “Economist” and Sadowski reported of the increased intolerance to the IZ 
that led to the election in March 1991 of “the first democratically elected reis ul-ulema, 
Jakub Selimoski.”73 
Traditionalist Islam enjoyed a brief resurgence in Bosnia in the late 1980. 
In 1988 about 500 of Bosnia’s 3000 imams gathered in Tuzla to lament 
the decay of morality and call for the reintroduction of traditional Islamic 
codes regarding schools, the role of women, and other practices. But the 
Imam’s movement, and Bosnian traditionalist generally, lacked the 
resources and organizational skills to form a durable political force….The 
senior ulama in Bosnia have been surprisingly progressive. While some 
are moderately conservative, most subscribe to reformism, the fourth 
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variety of political Islam….Instead of advocating an Islamic state, the 
Declaration [the Islamic Declaration – 1970 paper written by Alija 
Izetbegovic arguing that ‘the Islamic order can be realized only in those 
countries in which Muslims represent the majority of the population. 
Without this majority, the Islamic system is reduced only to naked power 
(because the second element, the Islamic society, is missing and may turn 
into tyranny’] calls for the creation of a new Islamic intelligentsia who 
will inspire a cultural renaissance.74  
Thus, as Kepel pointed out, pan-Islamism as a form of transnational social 
movement (TSM) gained considerable roots in Bosnia despite the fact that Young 
Muslims (whose member was Alija Izetbegovic) were dismantled by Tito in 1949.75 
2.  Religion as a Hallmark of a Nation - 1991-1995 War and the 
Contemporary Islamic Revival 
This Islamic revival underwent radical qualitative and quantitative changes from 
the beginning of the war in Bosnia in 1992. Before the start of the war, IZ had already 
embarked on becoming another Yugoslav ‘national church’ dedicated to the making of a 
Bosniak nation. Apart from IZ, the party created by Alija Izetbegovic provided another 
organizational structure for gathering popular support for the Islamic cause, both abroad 
and in the country. According to some sources, the sole ascension of SDA to power was 
due to its alliance with five hundred imams. As Perica pointed out, despite the IZ’s 
efforts to comply with the decision on the political neutrality of IC, “many clerics 
virtually remained party activists without a membership card.”76 The emerging political 
opportunity of carving up an Islamic state was grasped by Izetbegovic and the other 
hawks in SDA. Their growing power led to a coup in IZ which overthrew Selimoski as a 
mufti and installed Mustafa Ceric as reis-ulema. These factors paved the way for the 
arrival of the aid agencies and mujahidin in Bosnia. Here, I will explore the impact of 
their activity during and after the war only in terms of testing H1 and H2, while the issue 
of the link between Islamic revival and GSJ will be explored in Chapter IV. 
Left with utmost freedom of operation, the aid agencies and the mujaheddin were 
catalysts for the post-1991 process of Islamic revival due to the fact that in themselves 
they were new aggressive organizational and social agents of radical Salafi Islam that 
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readily fit into the bigger framework of Sufi-led revivalism. In addition, several other 
factors, as discussed below, facilitated their influence, such as the increased relations 
between Bosnia and the Muslim world due to the financial and political isolation in 
which the emerging Bosnian state was subjected to in the initial stages of the war, the 
transmission of radical ideas through the Bosnian religious students in the ME, and the 
proliferation of Arab literature, media and cultural invasion.  
The result was the materialization of radical Salafi mainstream parallel to Hanafi 
(traditional folk) Bosnian Islam, the emergence of local radical youth organizations like 
AIY and Supporters of Shariah, and the acquisition of foreign waqfs by the Saudis. All of 
the above led to indirect contention of the constitutional authority of IZ as the sole 
representative of the Bosnian Muslims granted by the constitution of 1997.  
a. “Secular State and Non-Secular Society”77 – SDA and/or 
Islamism (Political Opportunity, Cross Border Diffusion and 
Transnational Political Exchange) 
A conceptualization of developments in the 1990s in Bosnia inevitably 
entails close examination of the SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcie - Party of Democratic 
Action). The SDA political hegemony, platform and influence in the society can be 
interpreted in several ways. Definitely one might argue that it provided a political space 
and opportunity for the proselytisation of radical Islam in Bosnia. In this respect, the 
authority, moral and social credit endowed to Alija Izetbegović can be deemed as a vital 
pre-condition for the emergence of Islamism. Indeed, the sole establishment and survival 
of the country was based on the reification and resurrection of the Islamic identity which 
was tied irreversibly with the Bošniak nation. In addition, in the early years of the war 
(1992-1995), Izetbegović and Party leadership were advocating a “secular state and non-
secular” society. As Lederer (2001) pointed out, “the ruling Party has had a pronounced 
Islamic orientation and the symbiosis of ethnic and national identities, ideology and 
power, Party and state, allowed it to extend its control over the population, which voted 
for it massively at several elections.”78 Nevertheless, Islamism in this respect did not 
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amount to a broadly based social movement. One possible reason is that it was mainly an 
elitist phenomenon and there was a political consensus in the country. There were no 
viable contention issues rather than the war that could emulate into strong Islamic social 
movement. The sheer fact that SDA was using Islamic authority could pass as a political 
opportunity, but it actually diffused any possible flames that could have spurred 
collective action against the government. External factors and the political isolation of the 
emerging state were important to cross-border diffusion79 and transnational political 
exchange,80 mainly with Iran and Saudi Arabia. For a long time, the Bosnian president 
pleaded for international intervention. Yet neither the United States nor the European 
Union was ready to go to war for the state they had recognized. Izetbegovic turned 
increasingly to Islamic states, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya, for 
assistance.  
These states, mainly Saudi Arabia and Iran, have been an object of 
scholarly interest since the 1990s, primarily in the realm of financing terrorism. Here, my 
goal is quite different – to analyze their long term policy of proselytisation of Shia and 
Wahabbi Islam as a catalyzing factor in shifting the nature of the contemporary Islamic 
revival in Bosnia. The momentum their influence gained still has effects on the Bosnian 
Muslim society currently.  
(1) Iran. Iranian influence was more at the political, military 
and governmental level which opened the way for the transfer of 3,000 to 5,000 
mujahedeens, arms and supplies for the Bosnian army.  
President Clinton secretly gave a green light to covert Iranian arms 
shipments into Bosnia in 1994 despite a United Nations arms embargo that 
the United States was pledged to uphold and the Administration's own 
policy of isolating Tehran globally as a supporter of terrorism, according 
to senior Administration officials and other sources. Two top U.S. 
diplomats, acting on instructions from the White House and the State 
Department, told Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in early 1994 that the 
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United States would not object to the creation of an arms pipeline that 
would channel the weapons through Croatia and into Bosnia-
Herzegovina.81 
American decision further facilitated Iranian penetration in the 
region. As a CIA officer told Congress in a classified deposition in 1996 cited by Loretta 
Napoleoni (2003), “There was no question that the policy of getting arms into Bosnia was 
of great assistance in allowing the Iranians to dig in and create good relations with the 
Bosnian government.”82 Iran's influence is not only limited to Iranians coming to Bosnia. 
The New York Times on March 3, 1996 quoted a senior European military officer who 
suggested that ideological indoctrination represented an even bigger threat to the West 
than the technical training those troops received. According to Napoleoni, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran were able to convince the U.S. that they were backing its plan to redraw the map 
of the country while “secretly having their own agenda ‘to spread Islamic colonization in 
the region.”83 
(2) Saudi Arabia.  The Saudi government actively used 
financial means and diplomatic ties with the emerging Bosnian state in order to launch a 
sustained aid effort, which after the war evolved in open promotion of Islamic revival 
through Wahhabi Islam.  
During the war, King Fahd held regular meetings with President 
Izetbegovic to coordinate both diplomatic and military efforts. To provide direct relief for 
the Bosnian Muslims, the Government of Saudi Arabia immediately launched a sustained 
aid effort, supplemented by private donations from the Saudi population. In this respect, 
in May 1992, the Supreme Committee for the Collection of Donations for the Muslims in 
Bosnia, headed by Prince Salman, the Governor of Riyadh, was set up in the Kingdom as 
the channel for private donations.84 In Bosnia alone, Riyadh has spent over 600 million 
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on Islamic activities, according to official Saudi sources.85 The major distribution system 
established back in 1992 in fourteen offices in Bosnian cities and towns laid the basis for 
the influx of relief charities and foundations. In addition, several big foreign waqfs were 
established after 1995 which, by way of contract with the IC, granted full autonomy for 
various periods of time (usually two decades).86 
b. Spread of Islamic ITAN 
This can be best exemplified by the spread of Islamic religious institutions 
such as mosques, relief foundations, NGOs, charities, which boomed during the 1990s 
and only started to slow down after 9/11. According to South Eastern Europe (SEE) 
Security Monitor (02/02/2003), there are more than 250 religious humanitarian 
organizations in Bosnia emanating form the Middle East and Europe. They have been 
involved in providing various types of assistance to the needy, particularly the 
homeless.87 There has also been enough evidence that their main purpose has also been 
the proselytization of Wahhabi Islam and serving as fronts for AQ in the country.88  
The main supporters of salafi ideas were the following relief agencies: 
High Saudi Committee, Al-Haramain Foundation, and the Society for the Revival of 
Islamic Heritage (Jam‘iyyat Ihya’ al-Turah al-Islami). Among Bosnian organizations 
there are Active Islamic Youth (AIY), Furqan (closed down on December 31, 2002), 
Balkan Center u Zenici (for a short period), and Centre for the Affirmation of Islamic 
Sciences. The influence of these charities has been growing as the Reisu-I-ulema of 
Bosnia Mustafa Cengic pointed out in an interview in 2002: “Without them we could not 
survive.”89 
The Saudi government’s involvement in financing and proselytisation of 
Wahhabi Islam can be exemplified by the activity and resiliency of the Al-Haramain 
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foundation. In reality, the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, alongside the World Muslim 
League, is the Saudi’s largest Islamist front organization, controlled directly by the 
minister of religious affairs Saleh bin Abdul Aziz Al-Ashaikh. 90 In March 2002, the 
Saudi government reluctantly agreed to curb donations from the foundation and froze the 
office in Bosnia.91 However, in September 2002, the charity opened an Islamic center in 
Sarajevo that cost $530,000.92 When Al Haramain was ordered to cease its activities, its 
function was taken over by two other foundations – Saudi High Commission for Relief in 
Bosnia and Vazir (Wazir).93 The former was founded in 1993 by Saudi Prince Salman 
bin Abdul-Aziz and has been caring for 500 war orphans and paying the utility bills for 
many Bosnian families impoverished by the country's 1992-1995 war. Its Sarajevo 
headquarters cost an estimated $9 million and includes a massive mosque that 
accommodates 5,000 people, modern classrooms, a library, restaurants, and a sports 
hall.94 Wazir was based in Travnik and was closed in 2004, two years after Al Haramain 
assets were allegedly frozen in Bosnia.  
In addition, according to estimates by the Islamic Community,80% of the 
state’s 1,750 mosques were destroyed or damaged during the war. Now 50 to 60 have 
been rebuilt, both in urban and rural areas, mostly with money provided through the 
foreign relief foundations. Still, the overall control lies with the IC. In 1999, the IC 
controlled 946 mosques and 636 masjids, while 258 mosques and 112 masjids were under 
construction. The IC employed 1,119 persons as imams, mu‘allims and khatibs.95  
c. Islamic Education in the Middle East 
Besides relief agencies and mujahidun, another in the long range and 
perhaps the most important vehicle for the transmission of reformist ideas from the 
Middle East to Bosnia are students. Again, Alibasi (2003) provided the most relevant 
                                                 
90 Alexiev (2002); and Napoleoni, 115. 
91 “US, Saudi to Freeze Charity Assets,” Muslim American Society, January 22, 2004 
http://www.masnet.org/news.asp?id=857, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
92 Napoleoni, 115. 
93 “US, Saudi to Freeze Charity Assets.” 
94 Brian Whitmore, “Saudi 'Charity' Troubles Bosniaks,” Bosnian Report 29-31, June-November 
2002, http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/report_format.cfm?articleid=886&reportid=155, last accessed on 
October 13, 2005. 
95 Alibasi, 7, n. 12. 
33 
data in this regard. Today, the number of Bosnian graduates of Islamic studies outside the 
country equals the number of graduates from the Faculty of Islamic Studies. At the 
moment (2004), there are about a hundred Bosnian students of Islam in Saudi Arabia, 
about 60 in Syria, 40 in Egypt, 35 in Jordan, 30 in Iran, 10 in Pakistan, 10 in Turkey, and 
about 20 in Malaysia. Although many of these students adopt salafi ideas, others do not, 
and they easily find their place in the IC upon return to the country.96 I will further 
elaborate on the tensions between IC and the Sufi institutions, but now it is enough to just 
outline that the IC today employs some 15 Ph. D. holders, an equal number of MA 
holders, and over 500 graduates from different Islamic and secular faculties in and 
outside the country. Its educational system consists of six madrasas in Bosnia and two in 
Zagreb (Croatia) and Novi Pazar (Sandžak, Serbia) with some 1300 pupils, the Faculty of 
Islamic Studies in Sarajevo and three academies for teacher training (Zenica, Bosniaa and 
N. Pazar) with some 800 students. In addition, the IC has a 460 year-old library, the 
publishing center named El-Kalem, the Center for Islamic Architecture, the News 
Agency MINA, Office for Diaspora, and Directorate of Waqfs. 
As of today, Islamic education is provided in 1,405 maktabs (elementary 
informal religious schools) for 60,000 regular pupils, 13 Islamic high schools (madrasa), 
two Islamic academies for training teachers of religious education in state schools, and 
the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo. These, however, are not the only institutions 
where Bosnians acquire Islamic knowledge. Hundreds of Bosnians are currently enrolled 
at various universities throughout the (mainly Muslim) world. In addition, the IC employs 
as religious leaders (imams) many graduates from non-Islamic universities. 
d. Islamic Revival through the Spread of Islamic Culture 
In addition, Bosnia after 1992 was flooded with all kinds of Islamic ideas 
and literature. Again, there are clear indications about the underlying contention for 
influence between the IC and pro-salafi organizations. The IC and its institutions publish 
several fortnight newspapers and journals. The most widely circulated are the fortnightly 
“Preporod” (print run of 19,000 copies) and the educational journal “Novi muallim” 
(2,800 copies), while the oldest is the official herald of the IC, the bimonthly “Glasnik.” 
The monthly “Islamska misao” has not been published since 1992. Now, the second most 
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widely read Islamic magazine (fortnightly) is “Saff,” published by pro-Salafi AIY (9,000 
copies per issue). The tone of the articles in the magazine is much more moderate that the 
discourse of some members of the organization itself. Another important magazine is the 
monthly “Novi horizonti.”97 
In terms of the influence that external ‘authorities’ are having on the 
traditional forms of Islam and on the further promotion of the Salafist ideas, it is worth 
making a comparative analysis of some of the web sites that are supported by the IC and 
the Salafists. The Rijaset offers, as much as the one based in Sarajevo IslamBosna.com, 
advice and interpretative information from religious authorities. Both sites are focusing 
on the diaspora, despite the fact that the latter is dominated by Sayyid Qutb and Muslim 
Brotherhood.98 Supporters of the Shariah website are in sharp contrast with the ones that 
traditionally profess folk Islam. It is not much different from the rest of the Salafist 
websites.  
B. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
The historic retrospective lays the groundwork for testing my hypothesis, which 
would allow for an operationalization of the current Islamic Revival in the Balkans and 
answer the stated research question. In this section, I test H1 and H2 against the findings 
of the Bosnian case study.  
1. H1: The Process of Islamic Revival is Mainly an Imported (edic) 
Phenomenon 
Usually the process of revival is a mix of local and imported factors. 
Nevertheless, my principal argument is that, despite the fact that prewar turmoil, war and 
genocide facilitated the process of the “nationalization” of Islam, the current Islamic 
revival has deviated from its projected development defined by the events in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The influx of external agents between 1992 and1995 not only turned the 
heartland of Bosnia into “another Mecca,”99 but it also reshaped the then ethno-
nationalistic-religious revival and added to it a more extreme Salafi element to it. Though 
most of these agents were flushed out of the country after the war, the created social and 
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financial networks on the ground have been continually sustaining the phenomena. This 
has been done mainly through the local youth organizations that the radical Salafi 
elements helped create, or through evading the security state measures and maintaining 
agents’ physical presence in the state.  
It is not a surprise that these agents fit into the Sufi dominated orders in central 
Bosnia. Though it is arguable whether they were inspired by the Salafi ideas, it is a fact 
that through their activity in the 1970s and 1980s the Sufi orders provided a permissive 
environment for the emergence of Salafi offshoot of Islam in parallel to the traditional 
Hanafi Islam.  
As Perica (2003) specified, in 1995 more than 190 various Islamic organizations 
(including branches of the militant Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Taliban) operated in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Certainly, as Evan Kohlmann (2004) certified, most of the relief 
agencies such as TWRA, BIF, Al-Muwafaq, etc. were used as fronts for financing 
mujahedins. The latter, soon after the commencement of the war, started using Bosnia as 
“the springboard for a greater and more expansive international ‘holy struggle’.”100 
However, it is also evident that these agents were heavily involved in proselytizing 
radical Salafi Islam. This activity did not stop with the signing of the Dayton accords. On 
the contrary, most Islamic fighters remained in the country through marrying local 
women or under the provision of the former Citizenship Law that made it possible for the 
foreign members of the Army of Bosnia to obtain citizenship. The glaring example of 
such a preaching activity is Imad el-Misri, who was arrested on July 18, 2001 and later, 
on October 1, 2001, deported to Egypt. According to one of the emic reports provided by 
Esad Hecimovic, after eight years of constant activity in central Bosnia and in the region 
of Sarajevo, the number of el-Misri’s followers is estimated to be in the hundreds, 
perhaps even thousands.101 His activity did not recede after the war, as between 1992 and 
1995, more than 2000 Bosniaks went through a forty-day religious training led by el-
Misri, which is a precondition for the admittance into the El-Mujahid brigade. According  
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to his supporters, el-Misri supervised nineteen training sessions during the war, and six 
after the war. He also held numerous lectures on behalf of the Active Islamic Youth,102 
an organization recruiting young Bosniak Muslims.  
Aid agencies and NGOs still have high profiles in the country. The NGOs evolved 
into local branches or closed and opened new offices under other names (the above 
example of al-Haramain is prevalent). While the former helped during the war to 
intensify the Islamic revival of the 1970s and 1980s and “revive the jihadi spirit,”103 after 
1995, along with the Bosnians, they opened Islamic kindergartens, halal food restaurants 
and meat shops.  
Several authors ignore this contextual change in the general trends of Islamic 
revival and the emergence of a more radical one through the active support of these 
external agents. According to Alibasic, Perica and Schwarz, for example, “the attempted 
Islamic revolution lost momentum”104 and “things are going back to normal.”105 Though 
they admit that Islamic radicalism and Muslim nationalism have not been completely 
defeated, they put forward the argument that a large portion of the Bosnian population (a 
large number of urban Muslims) has chosen democracy, secularism and new Europe.106 
Apart from the issue of whether Europe is ready to accept them, as discussed in Chapter 
V, my argument is that (a) such findings do not necessarily incorporate into their analysis 
the situation in the rural areas, (b) they are not taking into account the continual existence 
and operation of the same agents that spurred Salafism in the first place and (c) they 
necessarily adopt a structuralist approach that depicts the Islamic revival in the state as 
necessarily supported and promoted by the ruling political elite, and, thus, the removal of 
the latter as a necessary and sufficient condition for curbing and dissolving radical 
Islamic revival in the country.  
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Such arguments do not take into account the social dynamics and the changes in 
social terrain in certain areas of the country and ignore the continual external support for 
such an activity. Instead, I argue that the original Islamic resurgence of the 1970s and 
1980s waned as the new Bosnian state was created after the war. This original Islamic 
revivalism took another direction toward propagation of more radical ideas. Such radical 
Islamic revival is an imported phenomenon and the following factors account for both its 
sustenance and manifestations: 
• Financial backings coming from the Arab states. 
• Ideological influence through the educated in the Middle East Islamic 
students. 
• Continual existence and activity of Islamic ITAN on the ground. 
Saudi influence and financial support have been materialized through the 
establishment of several big (multi-million) foreign waqfs after 1995. There are several 
centers whose primary purpose is the proselytisation of Wahhabi Islam – the Cultural 
Center King Fahd (CCKF) in Sarajevo, the Cultural center in Hadzici near Sarajevo, the 
Saudi cultural center in central Bosnian town of Bogojno, etc. Until several years ago, the 
High Saudi Commission for the Relief of Bosnian Muslims (HSC) had administered 
CCKF without even consulting with the IC.107 HSC also gave full support to support 
local Salafi organizations such as AIY and Furqan. Though Furqan was dissolved in 
2002, the link between the former and HSC is not severed. In addition, in his recent 
report at Berkeley, Ahmet Alibasi (2005) pointed out that “we see again mosques, and 
other Islamic institutions (re)built by foreign Muslims, which has not been the case for 
over a century. Today Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Indonesia, etc. have mosques after 
their names in Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities.”108  
In addition, according to the 2005 International Religious Freedom Report, 
released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: 
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There are also foreign missionaries who preach fundamentalist forms of 
Islam that tend to be intolerant of other religions and other forms of Islam. 
There are some reports that Muslims have been offered economic 
incentives to worship and/or dress in a way that is different from 
traditional Bosnian Muslim custom. ….Religious leaders from the 
Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox communities claim that all forms of 
observance are increasing among young people as an expression of 
increased identification with their ethnic heritage, in large part due to the 
national religious revival that occurred as a result of the 1992-95 Bosnian 
war. Leaders from the three main religious communities observed that 
they enjoy greater support from their believers in rural areas of Bosnia 
than from those in urban centers such as Sarajevo or Banja Luka.109 
Further, the trends outlined in the 1990s intensified in the new century. Both 
reports by Alibasic of 2002 and 2005 confirmed that the number of Bosnian graduates of 
Islamic studies outside Bosnia equals the number of graduates from the Faculty of 
Islamic Studies. At the moment, there are about 100 Bosnian students of Islam in SA, 60 
in Syria, 40 in Egypt, 35 in Jordan, 30 in Iran, 10 in Pakistan, 10 in Turkey, and about 20 
in Malaysia. As attested by recent surveys,110 this exchange of ideas has led to the 
projection, ideological and physical, of every group in the Muslim world into the social 
terrain of Bosnia.  
In essence, such an activity supports my third argument about the increase of 
transnational networks and exchanges of all kinds. “We are witnessing the coming (back) 
of transnational Islam to Bosnia: ideas, resources, movements, Islamic centers, networks, 
schools, and even cadres. As a result we today in Bosnia have almost every Islamic group 
(and religious practice associated with them) represented from the followers of Nursi to 
salafis, to revivalist, and even Abu Hamza’s group, at least on the Internet.”111 
This estimate still poses a legitimate question about the sources of such an Islamic 
revival. If all these organizational agents are seen on the ground, how can one be sure that 
it is still an imported phenomenon rather than one that is defined and spurred by the 
indigenous Bosnian Islamic organizations? 
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The answer to this question is not straightforward and calls for testing the second 
suggested hypothesis. Here, I would reiterate that the current Islamic revival is mainly 
foreign rather than a locally driven phenomenon. First of all, despite the increase in the  
proliferation of ideas, finances, Islamic organizations and ITAN, still the majority of the 
local population is adherent to the folk Hanafi Islam despite some “universal changes in 
practices.”112 
Second, such a revival is not sustainable by local Muslim thoughts or available 
financial sources. Without the latter it would not be able to persist on the ground. In 
reference to the former, except for the apologetic work “Islam between East and West” 
by the late Alija Izetbegovic, today “it remains the only text written by a Bosnian Muslim 
that is cited by Muslims in the central Muslim lands.”113  
Often the proliferation of NGOs and charities as part of the Islamic ITAN has 
been cited as an indication of social dynamics on the ground. In this respect, in order to 
test the viability of such local organizations that are rivaling IC for influence over the 
Bosnian Muslims, I suggest that such a proposition be tested against the Boomerang 
model suggested by Sikkink and Kick.  
Sikkink and Kick plumb international relations, social movement, network and 
other theories to come up with their major model. As I already indicated, after the shift of 
authority towards a more moderate and European oriented course and the 
institutionalization of the IC as the sole representative of the Umma, one should expect 
the Boomerang model to be well at work. Essentially it presupposes local NGO initiative 
surpassing recalcitrant local states, reaching foreign and international NGOs, foreign 
states and international organizations, so as to `boomerang’ back on local ones. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Bosnia, thus far there have not been any indications of such 
an activity. On the contrary, one can see the opposite reverse manifestation of the 
“international demonstration effect” through which not local but rather foreign 
organizations are trying to garner support through ideological and financial means over 
the local population and reshape their social agenda.  
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Still, such intense networking on the ground by the Islamic ITAN, including the 
above structural agents as Islamic charities, relief foundations, NGOs and the mosque 
network, begs further exploration of the possible changes in the social terrain spurred by 
their activities. Here, the research I have done and the above case study findings show 
that the end effects are along the spectrum locked between fragmentation/polarization of 
previously quite uniform Islam and the open contestation of the IC authority as depicted 
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Figure 2.   Mapping the Social Terrain Central Bosnia. 
 
According to Bougarel (2002), in Bosnia, what he terms as re-Islamization led to 
the transformation of the collective identity of the Islamic Community, without the 
corresponding modification of the individual behavior of its members.114 His findings 
that the financial assistance from the Muslim world, despite the short term effect of 
strengthening the Islamic religious institutions, would eventually destroy their unity and 
41 
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authority were recently backed up by Alibasic’s (2005) field study of central Bosnia115. 
Despite the fact that the latter attributed such developments to the process of 
deterritorialization, this thesis is more interested into the process analysis of possible 
social transformation on the ground. In line with the above findings and spread of ITAN, 
today the IC in Bosnia is forced to compete with new Islamic organizations for the 
position of the exclusive interpreter of Islam which it enjoyed for last six decades. Many 
do not feel easy about it and have requested (unsuccessfully) that the state do not license 
any entity with the word ‘Islamic’ in its name for example.116 
In this regard, it is more than imperative to elaborate on the possibility of any 
further developments, thus, the testing of the second suggested hypotheses remains 
crucial for the operationalizing of the Islamic revival in the Balkans, and Bosnia in 
particular.  
2. H2: The Observed Islamic Revival, Depending on the Characteristics 
of the Social Terrain of Various Balkan States, Constitutes the Initial 
Phase of the Emergence of Local Islamic Movements 
In order to test this hypothesis I will use SMT in order to operationalize the 
process of Islamic revival in Bosnia in the 1970s and 1980s. Then, I will implement the 
suggested analytical framework from Chapter I against the findings of section one. The 
latter will be viewed in terms of the changes in the social terrain and the increased role of 
ITAN in as a result of intense networking and the emergence of youth cultural and 
religious organizations on the ground. 
As far as SMT occupies a middle ground between structural theories and rational 
choice theories, in order to operationalize the Islamic revival in the 1970s and 1980s I 
will use the classical SMT framework which relies on the following three main variables: 
(a) political opportunities structures, (b) mobilizing structures, and (c) cultural framing.  
As the above case study findings unequivocally attest to, the political 
liberalization in Yugoslavia and the opportunity to declare themselves “as Muslims in the 
national sense” constituted viable policy and legal changes that provided the Islamic 
community, traditional Islamic clerics and Sufi orders locked between the competing 
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Catholic and Serbian churches with something that they could not have had and would 
not have refused – space. As I showed in the above case study, such a space allowed 
them to embark on an unprecedented rebuilding and expansion of Islamic religion. The 
local (emic) political opportunities were backed up by the larger process of Islamic 
revival in the Arab world, especially after the Iranian revolution that allowed for foreign 
financial support.  
Consequently, in the beginning of 1990s, building on the brewing contention 
against the Communist authorities and their supporters in the IZ, the emerging SDA 
provided the needed structural mobilizing agent in order for the phenomenon of Islamic 
revival to be able to gain broader social base and mobilize contention. In this regard, as 
Lederer117 (2001) identified, “the ruling Party has had a pronounced Islamic orientation 
and the symbiosis of ethnic and national identities, ideology and power, Party and state, 
allowed it to extent its control over the population, which voted for it massively at several 
elections.”  
Two necessary caveats are due here. First, the SDA’s ideology of Islamism was 
able to take advantage of the broad political changes that led to the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and harness the emerging political opportunities in order to materialize the 
Bosnian state and nation. Nevertheless, despite the fact that SDA used the existing 
traditional ulema and Sufi orders to further mobilize support for its cause, it is important 
to elaborate on the cultural toolbox that invoked certain framings that were able to 
resonate with the target audience. Here, I suggest that Islam or Islamic frames did not 
constitute the sharpest and most effective tool in the cultural toolbox. This thesis posits 
that what happened in the beginning of the 1990s and during the war was more of a 
process of nationalization of Islam rather than the Islamisation of the Bosnian nation. 
Due to the lack of myths, legends, historic symbols and values that were abundant with 
their enemies, Islam was the only cultural frame that could have resonated with the 
Bosnians. Thus, SDA used Muslim religion as a mobilizing frame and powerful identity 
modifier against the Serbian and Croatian threat. Such a choice does not come as a 
surprise as the Christian Orthodox Serbian and Croatian Catholic churches necessarily 
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depicted the war into religious cultural frames that due to the Turkish occupation of these 
lands easily caught up their denominations. For the Bosnians there had not been many 
choices, especially when they found themselves in the midst of a Serbo-Croatian rivalry 
in which both sides viewed them first as Muslims and second as Bosniaks or Slav 
descendents. A grim statistic of the war confirms the extent to which religion played in 
the conflict. Almost all Muslim historic and cultural landmarks located in the areas 
occupied by Serbs and Croats were destroyed, including 1,024 mosques and other 
Muslim religious sites.118 As Perica (2003) pointed out, “Slavic Muslims and their 
Islamic Community were primary targets of genocide carried out against them by the 
Serbs while also endangered by, post 1990, the increasingly unfriendly Croats.”119  
In this regard, the Islamic revival before 1991 in the face of the prewar turmoil, 
war and genocide allowed for readily usable cultural framings embedded in Islamic 
religion, which led on their part to unprecedented politicization and “nationalization of 
Islam.”120 
As far as we are still in the midst of the current process of Islamic revival and do 
not necessarily have the comfort of objective hindsight, whether the Islamic 
fundamentalism or what Bougarel terms as “ethic nationalism” was the driving force of 
Muslim militancy will remain a contentious issue at least in mid-term perspective. Here, 
my goal is to take into account and analyze the broader impact of such an Islamic revival 
on the spread of ITAN and establish the possible development of such revival in the 
1990s into a viable SM.  
Inarguably the 1992-1995 war was a catalyzing event that allowed for foreign 
organizational agents to be infused and radically changed the current process of Islamic 
revival. In this respect, the latter accounts more for what Tarrow terms cross border 
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diffusion121 facilitated by the transnational political exchange122 between SDA and 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) states.  
If SMT framework is applied in an attempt to operationalize the Islamic revival 
after the war, it is evident that both the political opportunity structure and cultural 
framings are two of the three variables that changed in such a way that it would be 
farfetched to identify any growing social movement on the ground. An independent state 
of Bosnia was established after Dayton, and especially after 2000 even the political and 
social settings did not facilitate any emergence of radical Islamic social movement 
dynamics on the ground. Nevertheless, I think such an analysis provides only satisfying 
findings while it does not necessary account for the real situation on the ground. As I 
showed above, for the last 10 years after Dayton, Islam in Bosnia has been straddling due 
to the fragmentation/polarization of the previously quite uniform Hanafi Islam. In this 
sense, due to what Roy called “deterritorialization,” Bosnia still provides post-battle 
space like Iraq and Afghanistan in which the “IC is forced to compete with new Islamic 
organizations for the position of exclusive interpreter of Islam which it enjoyed for last 
six decades.”123 
Here, in order to test the above hypotheses, I will implement McAdam’s 
analytical approach in order to operationalize the impact of the transnational networks in 
terms of ideas, resources, movements, Islamic centers, networks, schools and even 
cadres. I will focus on several structural agents already identified as the driving force 
behind the current Islamic revival and assess whether they have the potential of spurring 
a radical Islamic movement in Bosnia. In the parlance of classic SMT here, I will 
elaborate on the mobilizing structures and framing processes. Of greater importance for 
the current process are the Islamic ITAN and local youth religious organizations such as 
AIY.  
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As Tarrow pointed out, “though transnational advocacy networks are analytically 
distinct from social movements…they are biographically and thematically in the debt of 
social movements.”124 For Tarrow, the spread of ITAN is something positive and 
encouraging as “they are powerful base for a change in the world today.” Nevertheless, 
the case study of Bosnia showed that such a spread of these networks has not necessarily 
been embedded in the local social networks. In this regard, the principal contention of 
this thesis is that in the case of Bosnia, due to historical, cultural, and contextual factors, 
ITAN were not able to provide Islamic framings that were qualitatively different from the 
one used to reinforce the ethno-nationalism. Certainly the end effect of their activity on 
the ground has helped to create or intensify their global Muslim solidarity and emotional 
attachment to the global Muslim community – ummah. Still, using McAdam’s analytical 
framework, such an attachment hardly can be interpreted as what he terms a process of 
social appropriation – the social setting and the ideas that typically animate in social 
settings, along with the collective identity that binds the members of that setting together 
and somehow get appropriated in the service of the social movement. Certainly, ITAN 
has been able to tap and augment the process of Islamic revivalism and also provide sites 
such as mosques and cultural centers for sustainment of social movement activity. Still, I 
suggest that through some of its structural agents, ITAN actually played a very important 
role in the social appropriation of radical Salafi ideas from the Middle East, but mainly 
through the Islamic students that boomed in the Arab world after 1995. It is also 
important to point out that such a process of social appropriation necessarily takes longer 
than the time for “progressive intensification of beliefs and faith leading to acceptance of 
the GSJ ideology” in the case study suggested by Sageman (2004). 
Though ITAN in itself did not have the dynamic and the potential to spur a local 
social movement dynamic, they still were able, over the period of a decade, to spur some 
changes in some collective identities, routine cultural practices or organizational practices 
that got appropriated in this new line of action. As Alibasi attested to it, “the arrival of 
Islamic missionaries and mujahids, as well as the increase in the number of Bosnian 
students of Islam in the Muslim world, local interpretation of Islam, some Muslim 
practices and certain aspects of Muslim culture came under pressure of 
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universally/unitary Muslim ideas and movements.”125 One of these movements has been 
the GSJ. Before turning to the process of social appropriation that I deem the most crucial 
of all elements provided by McAdam, I would like to offer a brief anthropological 
analysis of the possible changes in the social terrain in central Bosnia.  
A crucial element in understanding such a dynamic is to follow the massive 
emergence and proliferation of local Islamic youth organizations predominantly in central 
Bosnia. In this respect, to understand their role, it is important to elaborate on the change 
of social interactions due to the influx of mujaheddin religious leaders and Bosnian 
students in Islam among the local traditionalist settings. Borrowing the concepts of 
communities of identities and communities of locality126, the Salafi followers led to 
qualitative change into the social terrain in central Bosnia by restructuring the traditional 
family relations and social hierarchy through building a new type of relationship by 
social appropriation of Salafi ideas. Such a process has been initially spurred by some of 
the religious leaders of the Salafi mujaheddin that were amply supported by the ITAN. In 
this regard, the example of Imad el-Misri provides an illustration of how the traditional 
communities of locality (based on the regional and extended family ties and relations) 
were gradually displaced by the community of identity centered on the Salafi ideology. 
Such social appropriation was done through the religious courses supervised and led by 
el-Masri as a prerequisite for entering in the el-Mujahid brigade. After the war, such an 
activity continued as he did the same for Active Islamic Youth. At the same time, as after 
the IC was endowed by the constitution to be the sole representative of Bosnian Muslims, 
the returning graduates of Islamic studies in the Muslim world has been often isolated by 
the IC and kept away from the IC run mosques. In effect, their activity naturally 
congregated in the central areas of Bosnia where they soon acquired considerable 
influence through the local foreign supported mosques or madrassas attended by youths 
in their formative years when they look for a different leader than the local traditional 
imam to follow.  
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Gradually over the period of 10 years through such transfer of ideas from the 
Middle East backed up by financial support from various ITAN currently led to the 
emergence of a contentious environment among the various Islamic groups and to social 
appropriation of more radical ideas. It is worth noting the importance of the local 
marrying of ITAN with organizations on the ground that have the potential to achieve the 
changes in views, practices, and beliefs previously discussed that would lead to local 
support of radical Islamic agenda on the ground. Thus, both the importance of previous 
jihad and current proselytisation of ITAN should not be underestimated. In this respect, 
ITAN and the Islamic graduates have appropriated or transformed the emerging youth 
organizations and spread the influence of radical ideas through them. In this regard, the 
process of non-relational diffusion and brokerage127 seem to account for the potential 
growth of such organizations into the Islamic movement.  
I offer a brief look into the evolution of AIY in Bosnia. The Active Islamic 
Youth, which the local media say has Saudi ties, was founded in 1995 to spread a 
stringent version of Islam called Wahhabism. Its national headquarters are in Zenica. 
Besides Sarajevo, the AIY’s main strongholds are in central Bosnia Travnik, Bogojno, 
and Zavidovci. The organization claims that it has over 2,000 members, mainly 
students.128 The growth of the organization that recruits mainly among the local youths 
started with the active support of mujahidin as Imas el-Misri. The majority of the 
members of these organizations are young men from rural areas although urban, highly 
educated youths are well represented as well. Their numbers are, however, uncertain and 
may reach a few thousand. In addition, it publishes the second most widely read Islamic 
magazine (fortnightly) “Saff” (9,000). It has been well-established how the organization 
supports itself, as there has been enough evidence that AIY has been relying primarily on 
its ties with the Saudi High Commission for Relief in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
several charities in the past such as Furkan. The AIY has been leaning toward ideas of 
Saudi dissidents Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-‘Awdah129 which is perhaps the reason 
behind the change in the HSC policy. While the essentials of the process of social 
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appropriation of Salafi ideas are among that which was described above, AIY poses 
interest as part of the greater question of the possible cultural frames that can lead to its 
and similar organizations’ radicalization. 
Such frames might emanate along the following issues. First, an escalating 
competition contention between IC and the Salafi organizations could spur greater 
contention actions. On several occasions, advocates of local Islamic tradition used 
violence against ‘Salafis’ in Bosnian mosques or simply prevented them from entering 
mosques.  
Second, the issue of returning refugees has been declared ahead of time as over. 
Nevertheless, the Bosnian offshoot of Muslim Brotherhood has actively started since 
2003 to recruit members of families of Muslim returnees in the territory of Republika 
Srpska, often in cooperation with the Bosniak humanitarian association Sedra.130  
Finally, the most viable frame for contentious actions that has been used came as 
a result of U.S./NATO interventionist policy, especially after 2001. In this respect, the 
societal memories of handling of Srebrenica massacre are still alive. In addition, AIY was 
able to stage several demonstrations in Sarajevo because of the handing over of six 
Algerian nationals that had been previously acquitted by the Bosnian court of terrorist 
charges.  
The implications of such existing repeating use of cultural frames go beyond the 
scope of the thesis. Nevertheless, while there is not a clear answer to what extent the 
current process of Islamic revival can be interpreted as an initial stage of the emergence 
of viable radical Islamic movement on the ground, I, through SMT, anthropological and 
structural analysis showed that Bosnia is still a contested ground for several competing 
Islamic groups and brands. In addition, the process of social appropriation of radical 
Salafi ideology has been evoked for more than ten years now while at the same time 
several cultural frames have been effectively used by local organizations to spur 
contentious actions.  
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The importance of the possible emergence of the Islamic movement in the country 
can be dwarfed by the possible contentious actions that can catch EUFOR in the middle. 
As in December 2004, British Major-General David Leakey commented, “Bosnia is still 
recovering from a very bloody war. The ethnic tensions which started the war, in a way 
are still here.”131 Even the very presence of peacekeeping forces could be a convenient 
target for radical elements as the recent arrest in November 2005 showed. Whatever the 
instigating effect, the possibility of ripple effects among the countries with considerable 
Muslim diaspora that make up EUFOR remain high, bearing in mind the November 
demonstrations in France, Germany and Belgium.132  
Another possibility is the possible local recruitment of Muslims into the global 
Salafi jihadist movement ideologically associated with Al Qaeda. While the former 
possibility goes beyond the purpose of this thesis, the latter will be further explored in 
Chapter V.  
C.  CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I offered an operationalization of the current Islamic revival in 
Bosnia, starting with a comparative historical analysis of the evolvement of the 
phenomena for the last 80-odd years.  
I showed that the revival in the country is sustained and supported mainly by 
foreign sources, organizations and Arab states. One of the principal conclusions that this 
chapter offers is that without such a financial and ideological support, the scope and 
character of the phenomena would be qualitatively different from the existing one.  
My analysis proved that Bosnia is a re-emerging contested area between the 
incumbent IC and the increasing number of Middle Eastern religious organizations, 
charities and foundations. 
Due to such a competition on the ground, I showed that local youth organizations 
on the ground have the resources and the potential to use the existing cultural frames in  
                                                  
131 As quoted in “EU Force Starts Bosnian Mission,” BBC News.com, December 2, 2004, 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/4060739.stm, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
132 For more on these instigating effects see Charles V. Pena, Al Qaeda: The Balkans Connection, 
(Mediterranean Quarterly) http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mediterranean_quarterly/v016/16.4pena.pdf, last 
accessed on October 13, 2005. 
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order to evolve into a possible radical Islamic social movement on the ground. The 
possible issues around which such a mobilization can be spurred are nationalism, refugee 
return and current governmental policy missteps. 
Catalysts for these frames can be the structural changes in the social terrain, the 
returning student of Islam from the Middle East, and the increasing social appropriation 
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III.  CASE STUDY OF BULGARIA 
A. BACKGROUND  
In this chapter, I offer a comparative case study of the Republic of Bulgaria in an 
attempt to operationalize the current Islamic revival in the country. Such a choice is not a 
random one, as it is driven by several factors. First, Bulgaria emerged as a key regional 
ally of the U.S. in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) after the refusal of Turkey to 
support Operation “Iraqi Freedom” (OIF). Such a position has also been predetermined 
by its geo-strategic situation, current membership in NATO and planned acceptance to 
the EU in the beginning of 2007. Second, the EU membership negotiation process has 
turned Bulgaria into a “doorstep of Europe” and front state in countering illegal human 
trafficking and immigration. According to the State Department’s 2005 Trafficking in 
Persons report, Bulgaria has been a “transit country and to a lesser extent, a source 
country”133 for trafficking. Third, despite the legacy of the “Revival Process”134 
conducted in 1984-1985, the growing instability of the region in the 1990s, and the late 
shift to market economy in 2006, Bulgaria not only managed to avoid slipping into the 
internecine religious conflict pattern set by Yugoslavia, but also emerged as a state often 
referred to as an “ethnic model”135 on the Balkans.  
In addition to the impact of these factors, Islamic revival in Bulgaria the country 
is a case that draws attention and deserves further analysis because of two counter-factors 
that gained momentum over the last decade. The country has not been spared from the 
general process of religious revival that has swept through Eastern and Central Europe 
since 1991. For example, 61 denominations, in addition to the Bulgarian Orthodox 
                                                 
133 US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2005, 73, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/47255.pdf, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
134 Mila Maeva, “The Revival Process and Its Influence on Bulgarian Turks’ Identity in Turkey,” 
Oxford Balkan Society: South East European Studies Programme, May 29-30, 2004, 2. 
http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/esc-lectures/maeva.pdf, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
135 Antonina Zhelyazkova, “The Bulgarian Ethnic Model,” East European Constitutional Review, 10, 
no. 4, (Fall 2001), http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol10num4/focus/zhelyazkova.html, last accessed on 
October 13, 2005, and “Ethnic Model for the Balkans,” Sofia Echo, 2001, 
http://www.sofiaecho.com/article/ethnic-model-for-the-balkans/id_2314/catid_5, last accessed on October 
13, 2005. 
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Church (BOC), were registered at the end of January 2005 – a 36% increase over the 
previous reporting period at the end of January 2004.136  
Over the last several years there has been intense infighting within the Muslim 
religious leadership that fueled the growing concerns about foreign funding and radical 
Islamic influence in the country’s minority enclaves. For instance, in 2004 according to 
the head of the Bulgarian military intelligence, “there are religious centres in Bulgaria 
that belong to Islamic groups financed mostly by Saudi Arabian groups, that possibly 
have links to radical organisations like the Muslim Brothers in Egypt.”137 Despite the fact 
that these centers were dismantled, still the issue of the scope, manifestations, and further 
evolution of this revival remains open.  
B. CHAPTER OUTLINE  
As previously noted, significant differences exist between states with majority 
and minority Muslim populations in the Balkans. This important dichotomy will be 
examined in comparative analyses of Bosnia and Bulgaria.  
I briefly outline the scope, characteristics and manifestations of the observed 
Islamic revival in the country. The first section offers an examination of the religious 
demography and historic overview of the development of Islamic religion in Bulgaria. I 
outline the diverse nature of the Islamic minorities in the country and argue for the need 
of a case by case approach when analyzing the current revival. 
The second section embarks on critical examination of the status of the major 
Muslim minorities under the communist rule (1944-1989) and operationalizes the Islamic 
revival after the democratic changes against the state policy for the last 15 years. It also 
elaborates on the cleavages among the Turkish and Bulgarian-speaking Muslim minority 
that led to the growing influence of foreign charitable foundations and NGOs in the 
ethnic minority areas.  
                                                 
136 Here is an example how the number of religious registration with the government increased 
between 2003 and 2005. In 2003 there were 36 in 2003, 45 in 2004 (increase of 25%) and 61 in 2005 (36% 
increase). For more see Bulgaria: International Religious Freedom Report 2004 and 2005, released by the 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, US Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35446.htm, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
137 “Bulgaria Dismantles Islamic Centres,” Daily Times, January 13, 2004, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_13-1-2004_pg7_44, last accessed on October 13, 
2005. 
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I argue that the current revival in Bulgaria has been qualitatively different from 
the one in Bosnia. First, the structural and ideological differences between ex-Yugoslavia 
and Bulgaria have to be taken into account. In the case of Bulgaria, such dissimilarities 
did not allow for the emergence of religion as a primary denominator of social relations. 
Second, the ruling political parties after 1991 embarked on a course of repaying the 
Muslim community for the historic injustices that they had been subjected to. Such a 
policy has been pursued in order to get political dividends and allow for a stable 
parliamentary or a governmental ruling coalition with the party representing Turkish 
minority – the Movement for Rights and Freedom. Finally, as a result of the internal 
political scene imperatives combined with the continual external EU pressure aimed at 
promoting religious tolerance in the country, the state inadvertently lost control in the 
Muslim minority populated areas of Bulgaria. Unlike the case of Bosnia, these factors 
allowed for a vacuum that has been easily filled by local and foreign religious 
organizations trying to increase their influence over the population. 
Building upon the findings in the second section, the third section will test the 
suggested hypotheses and operationalize the current revival in the contemporary context. 
I draw attention towards the growing dependency of some local Muslim organizations on 
foreign financial help that, especially in the areas inhabited by the Bulgarian-speaking 
Muslims, already has spurred some changes in the social terrain that led to the social 
appropriation of Salafi ideas. 
The thesis suggests a differentiated approach towards the issue of revival 
depending on whether the focus of analysis is on the Turkish, Kasilbashi or Pomak 
minority. My principal argument is that because of their diversity, inter-competition and 
mutual perceptions of each other, it is incorrect to argue that there is a unified, 
mainstream Islamic revival. On the contrary, I claim that every ethnic (religious) minority 
has to be analyzed separately and then in relation to the others, and then to the Christian 
community. Such an approach maintains that there are several tiers in the observed 
mainstream revival that need to be put into perspective.  
In terms of the prospect of the current revival, I argue that like Bosnia, Bulgaria 
constitutes an emerging contested arena between radical Middle Eastern organizations 
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and the local Mufti that necessitates a revised state policy. In the last section I offer 
several starting points for analyzing the contentious link between Islamic revival and GSJ 
in Chapter IV. 
C. ISLAM IN BULGARIA – HISTORIC OVERVIEW 
1. Religious Demography 
Muslim minorities have been an issue for almost every Bulgarian government 
since the state gained independence in 1878 after almost 500 years of Turkish occupation 
and oppression. Since the first census of 1887, the question of religious affiliation was 
explored. Unlike any other state in the Balkans, religious identity has not been directly 
associated with the ethnic one. The primary reason was that Bulgaria was the last state 
that gained independence from Turkey and, at the same time occupying a strategic place 
in the underbelly of Europe, the country and its population has been continuously 
subjected to sporadic Turkish assimilation campaigns. Certainly there has been 
contention whether such campaigns really existed, but what is more important in this case 
is the legacy of the Turkish rule. As noted, it would be incorrect to lump and view all the 
ethnically diverse religious minorities that practice Islam into one homogenous Islamic 
community. Such an argument can be made for Bosnia, but in the case of Bulgaria it is 
more appropriate to talk about Islamic communities rather than a united ummah. The 
purpose of this section is to cast out the main characteristics of these communities 
through a synthetic analysis of the Bulgarian history for the last 120 years.  
I suggest as a starting point a comparative view of the population of Bulgaria 
according to its religious affiliation as shown in Table 1. Then, a brief analysis of the 








POPULATION BY DISTRICTS AND RELIGION GROUP AS OF 1.03.2001 
Districts Total Christian Moslem Other Not stated Unknown 
Total 7 928 901 6 638 870 966 978 14 937 283 309 24 807 
 
POPULATION BY DISTRICTS AND ETHNIC GROUP AS OF 1.03.2001  
Districts Total Bulgarian Turkish Gypsies Other Not stated Unknown
Total 7 928 901 6 655 210 746 664 370 908 69 204 62 108 24 807 
 
POPULATION BY DISTRICTS AND MOTHER TONGUE AS OF 1.03.2001  
Districts Total Bulgarian Turkish Gypsies Other Not stated Unknown
Total 7 928 901 6 697 158 762 516 327 882 71 084 45 454 24 807 
 
Table 1. Results of the 2001 Census. 
 
As seen in Table 1, the Christian orthodox denomination constitutes 6,552,751 
people, or 82.6% of the population. The fact that over a 100-year period the segment of 
the population professing orthodox Christianity has not changed much, between 80.7% in 
1900 and 85.7% in 1992, led to the codifying of the role of the Christian church in the 
Bulgarian Constitution. According to article 13 (3) “Eastern Orthodox Christianity shall 
be considered the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria.”138 
The figures for the Muslim minority in the country could be misleading as at first 
glance there is a discrepancy between the numbers of the Muslim and the Turkish 
minority (also Turkish speaking individuals). The internal specifics of the Bulgarian 
Muslim minorities account for the differences in comparison to the Bosnia case. The 
religious affiliation is not directly associated or tied with ethnicity. Before delving into 
these specifics, it is worth picturing the spectrum and specifics of Muslim minorities in 
the country. 
The Muslim population of Bulgaria generally includes Turks, Pomaks, Gypsies 
and Tatars. They can be categorized into three main ethnic groups: Turks, Bulgarian-
speaking Muslims (Pomaks) and Roma (Gypsy) Muslims. According to the census 
statistics in Table 1, they constitute about 12.2% of the population. Nevertheless, there 
                                                 
138 Bulgarian Constitution, Chapter 1: Article 13.3, http://www.online.bg/law/const/const1.htm, last 
accessed on October 13, 2005. 
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are no clear statistics accounting for the number of Pomaks.139 There has been scarce 
data in terms of what portion of the Turks are Sunni or Shia. For the purpose of this 
thesis, I posit a total number of Pomaks in the realm of about 120,000.  This is the 
difference between the people with Muslim religious affiliation (966,978) and those that 
speak only the Turkish language (746,664).140 As far as the Turkish population, 
delineation between Sunnis and Shiites is hardly known among them as most of the 
population is professing Hanafi (or folk Islam). Nevertheless, the number of the Shias is 
about 1.0% of the Turkish minority, which is about 80,000, known popularly as 
Kusulbashi or Alevi.141 The latter will not be part of the follow-up analysis as they in 
many ways maintain the Orthodox customs of communion, confession, and honoring 
saints, and thus constitute a fairly insulated cultural yet well integrated socially group of 
the general population.  
Geographically, almost 80% of the Turks live in two compact zones in 
Northeastern and Southeastern Bulgaria, while 90% of the Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) 
live in the Rhodope Mountains on the Bulgarian— the Greek border.  
2.  Origins of the Muslim Minorities and Their Relation with the State in 
the 20th Century 
The outlined religious demography shows that not only Bulgaria has been on the 
crossroads between Europe and the Middle East, but also constitutes the cradle of Balkan 
Islam and the homeland of Slavic Christianity.  
a. Turks  
Bulgarian historical science, depending on the historic period, has put 
forward two contradictory theories about the Ottoman invasion and the origins of the 
 
                                                 
139 For the sake of clarity it is necessary to point out that the terms “Pomaks” and “Bulgarian 
Muslims” are used interchangeably; adherents to Islam in Bulgaria are referred to as “Muslims of 
Bulgaria.” 
140 This figure is also close to the one that is based on 1992 census when 70,252 persons declared 
“ethnic Bulgarian” identity, but Muslim religion. In addition, about 35,000 Bulgarian-speaking Muslims 
from the Rhodopes registered as Turkish-speaking and about 70,000 of them declared “ethnic Turkish” 
identity. For more see “The Human Rights of Muslims in Bulgaria in Law and Policies since 1878,” 
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (Sofia, November, 2003), 3-4, 
http://www.bghelsinki.org/special/en/2003_Muslims_fm.doc, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
141 According to 1992 census there are 83,537 Shiite Muslims in Bulgaria and Turkish is the mother 
tongue of 58,060 of them. Still, most of the Alevi are not quite familiar with the term Shiite Muslims.  
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Turkish population in Bulgaria. These theories are in direct correlation with the 
contradictory policies of the Bulgarian state towards Turkish and other Muslim 
minorities.  
The first theory posits that the Ottoman invasion in the 14th century was 
followed by intensive colonization of the population from Asia Minor.142 The second 
theory argues that the Turkish community in Bulgaria is considered to be a result of 
large-scale forced conversions of Islam or voluntary conversions which caused people to 
gradually forget their Bulgarian language.143 In respect to the first theory, the ethnic 
origin of Bulgarian Turks has never been disputed since the independence of 1878, while 
the latter theory positing to the existence of turkicised Bulgarians was at the center of the 
1980’s assimilation campaign.144 
b. The Bulgarian-Speaking Muslims (Pomaks) 
Currently every state, in which the Pomaks live, namely Bulgaria, Greece, 
and Turkey, has its own theory of their origin in line with that state’s nationalistic policy. 
This minority has certainly been the source of much controversy in the Bulgarian society. 
In Bulgaria, Pomaks are referred to as both “Bulgarian Mohammedans” and “Pomaks.” 
The second is mainly used in pejorative terms. Usually the majority of the ethnic 
Bulgarians believe that Pomaks are Turkicised Bulgarians and tend to look down upon 
them as “traitors of the faith,” “apostates,” etc.145 Several sources uphold the position 
that the Pomaks between themselves are not quite clear about their origins. In this 
respect, their preferential ethnic affiliation has an interesting geographic structure – in the 
Western Rhodope Mountains they prefer to be Turks, in the Middle Rhodope – 
Bulgarians, and in the Eastern Rhodope and northeastern Bulgaria – they prefer the 
neutral term “Muslims.”146 Still, the general negative attitude of the ethnic Bulgarian 
                                                 
142 Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, n. d., 1, www.emz-
berlin.de/projekte_e/pj41_pdf/Marushiakova.pdf, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
143 Ibid., 2. 
144  Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, “The Human Rights of Muslims in Bulgaria in Law and Policies 
Since 1878,” (November, 2003), 5, http://www.bghelsinki.org/special/en/2003_Muslims_fm.doc, last 
accessed on October 13, 2005. 
145 Ibid., 11. (Note: For this reason, they are called Torbeshi in Macedonia as referring to people that 
sold their religion for a torba (bag) of beans.) 
146 Marushiakova and Popov, 1.  
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population, the cultural differences between the Pomaks and the Turkish minority, and 
the state policies of forced assimilation before 1991 elevate the importance of the social 
terrain analysis in connection with the Islamic revival in the country.  
D. ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN BULGARIA  
1. Muslim Minorities and the Bulgarian State 
In order to understand the current dynamics and evolution of Islam in Bulgaria in 
the context of the outlined Muslim communities, a brief overview of the uneasy relation 
between Islam and the Bulgarian state is due. For the purpose of this thesis, I focus on the 
period after 1944 which laid down to a greater extent the array of state policies after the 
fall of communism.  
After the communist take over on September 9, 1944, the ethnic minorities in the 
country became the targets of either elaborate policy of respecting and promoting their 
religious and cultural rights or outright assimilation campaigns that had their climax in 
the 1984.  
The main contention of this section is that the relations between the state and 
Muslim minorities have not been based on religious but rather on nationalistic grounds. I 
also argue that the two-pronged state policies of force assimilation and attempts to 
increase the level of education and thus secularize the Turkish minority led to the 
emergence of intellectual elite that was able to capitalize on the mistakes of the 
communist governments before 1991 in the post-communist period. The political 
opportunities after 1991 led to the emergence of an initially ethnic political party that 
secured the Bulgarian ethnic model at the expense of having the decisive influence over 
the political developments in Bulgaria for the last 15 years. 
Immediately, after WWII, Islam was looked upon in line with the communist 
ideology which basically rejects any religion. Thus, despite the initial official state course 
of incorporation of the minorities into the new society, there were concentrated efforts by 
the state to gradually ban religious education, nationalize all Quranic schools and all 
private (including Turkish) schools, and impose uniform curriculum by the year 1952.147 
Inevitably, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the authorities came up with the slogan 
                                                 
147 Marushiakova and Popov, 15.  
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“Cultural revolution” that was aimed at rejecting the all religious backwardness and 
fanaticism.148 From this period on until 1984, the relationship between the state and the 
minorities started to continually deteriorate. Initially the government adopted a somewhat 
two-sided approach that on the one hand argued for integration of national minorities, 
while on the other side curtailed and supervised the their rights.149 The initial focus was 
against the Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) – since mid-1960s there has been several 
campaigns of changing their names and attempts of “Patriotic Upbringing of the 
Bulgarian Mohammedans.”150 At the same time, through negotiations with Turkey, part 
of the Turkish population (about 50,000) was able to leave Bulgaria in the 1968 to 1978 
period. At the same time, between 1959 and 1972, Turkish schools were merged with 
Bulgarian schools and Turkish language instruction was gradually and effectively 
eliminated.  
By 1974, the names of 220,000 Pomaks had been changed.151 By that time, the 
new Constitution of 1971 abolished all mention of minorities and religious rights, merely 
preserving the vague definition of “a citizen of non-Bulgarian origin.”152 What was later 
formulated as the ‘revival process’ had its apogee in the second half of January and the 
beginning of February 1985 and started with a 1978 resolution of the Central Committee 
of the BCP accepted as “Resolution for the Improvement of Work among the 
Descendants of Islamized Bulgarians.”153 The associated name changing campaign in 
1981 that essentially followed the one of 1962 and 1971 has been also associated with 
movement restrictions imposed on Pomaks in order to keep them separated from the 
enclaves of Turkish minority.  
                                                 
148 Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 56. 
149 Ibid., 57. 
150 Marushiakova and Popov, 17. (Note: This was a 1970 resolution of the Bulgarian Communist 
Party.) 
151 Every non-Slavic or non-Bulgarian first and family name had to be changed into a Slavic one. 
Usually the Pomaks and the Turks had Turkish or Arabic names that also did not have the customary 
suffixes –ov or –ev—for the Bulgarian family names. Thus, the changes were among those lines: for 
example, a person whose original name was Naim Suleimanoogly most likely had to change his name to 
Naum Shalamanov, a perfectly sounding Bulgarian word.  
152 Bulgarian Constitution of 1971, art. 45, para. 7, as cited by Marushiakova and Popov, 19. 
153 Marushiakova and Popov, 20. 
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Finally, the authorities embarked on the program of ‘revival’ (1985) that started 
with name changes of all Turks and other Muslims living in the Rhodope Mountains and 
soon affected all Turks living in the country. The process was accompanied by a 
widespread campaign for obliterating all signs of Turkish identity, such as specific styles 
of dress, religious customs, oriental music and forbidding the use of Turkish language in 
public.154 
2. Islamic Revival Before 1989  
Due to the uneasy relations between the Bulgarian state and Muslim minorities 
and the total control of the state over the religious issues, Islamic revival before 1991 is 
hard to operationalize or even determine to what extent it ever existed. My contention 
here is that such revival emerged more in terms of various forms of Islamic activism as a 
reaction to the state policy and repression. Nevertheless, there is not enough evidence to 
unequivocally show whether the underground Islamic activism emerged as a reaction to 
the state in the 1980s or that it never ceased to develop after WWI and just took a more 
secretive turn after that.  
In the beginning of the 1980s (before the 1984/5 assimilation campaign), Bulgaria 
was shaken by a series of terrorist bombings that mainly hit the railway stations of Sofia 
and Plovdiv (the biggest cities), Varna airport, etc. Most of them were associated with 
secretive Turkish groups. Still, to this day it is unclear what were the real motivations of 
such attacks and whether they were spurred by religious radicalism or initiated by the 
Bulgarian secret services.  
Apart from that, the Sufi orders in Bulgaria did not cease to exist and indeed  
continued to operate. For example, in 1982, the authorities intercepted and banned a 
meeting by Naksibendi and Kadiri tariqas.155 Nevertheless, due to the total domination 
of the state, Muslim minorities in Bulgaria did not have the political opportunity to 
develop influential Islamic opposition in opposition to the official Muslim organizations 
and clerics. They were both penetrated by the state security services or financially 
dependent on the authorities. For example, the Chief Mufti’s Office, the regional Mufti’s 
offices and the Muslim communities received subsidies from the state and the clerics 
                                                 
154 Marushiakova and Popov, 23. 
155 Ali Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria (London: Hurst & Co., 1997), 74.  
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were socially secured and received state pensions.156 After 1985, the Resolution of the 
Imam meeting even stated in the face of the ongoing “Revival process” that “Muslim 
Bulgarians never belonged to the Turkish nation.”157  
In addition, in the absence of formal theologian training, usually the post of 
hodzha was passed down the family line, from father to son or uncle to nephew. At the 
same time the illegal course in Turkish language and the Koran were organized in the 
secrecy of private homes.158 
There are two major consequences of the pre-1991 state policy. First, it created an 
irreparable rift between the Muslim minorities.  The state was successful in using the 
Pomaks in setting them into the administration of the revival process in the minority 
areas. That destroyed the previously existed links between the Turkish and Bulgarian—
speaking Muslims. Second, after the democratic changes, Muslim minorities did not have 
uncompromised religious leaders to utilize the opened political opportunities.  
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the political activism against the state failed in 
1985, the new political currents of perestroika led to the emergence of political 
opportunities that allowed the minority Muslim population to organize several 
demonstrations and protests in May-June 1989. While accounting for the existence of 
underground organizations, there has not been any evidence that such social protests were 
utilizing any religious cultural contention frames. Still, the legacy of the 1944 to 1989 
period defines the permissive environment for the resurgence of Islam and minority rights 
after democratic changes. 
3. Current Islamic Revival in Bulgaria 
In this section I offer a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the current Islamic 
revival in Bulgaria. The Islamic revival elaborates on the revived interest towards 
                                                 
156 Maria Koinova, “Minorities in Southeast Europe: Muslims of Bulgaria,” Center for 
Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe – Southeast Europe (CEDIME-SE), December. 
1999, 10, http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/cedime-se-bulgaria-muslims.doc, last accessed on October 13, 
2005. 
157 Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (BTA), 1985 as cited in Koinova, p. 12. 
158 Nadege Ragaru, “Islam in Post-Communist Bulgaria: An Aborted 'Clash of Civilizations?” 
Nationalities Papers, Vol. 29, No 2, 2001, 6, 
http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/cbjnrwrqunna9alwup4u/contributions/w/9/n/n/w9nnqnhjhak2j
qqd.pdf, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
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religion as an ethnic identifier after years of suppressed religiosity, the politicization of 
ethnicity manifested in the emergence of several ethnic political parties of which 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms proved crucial in maintaining ethnic stability unlike 
the case of Bosnia, and, finally, the different scope and character of the revival among the 
Turks and Pomaks.  
My principal contention is that this phenomenon should be viewed in the context 
of (a) interethnic relations between the two main Muslim minorities159, (b) lack of 
religious elites to spur the sustained theological revival, and (c) resurgence and defense of 
the Muslim identity.  
The Islamic revival in the first years after the “velvet revolution” took the form of 
rediscovering the religious roots and rebuilding of Muslim institutions. It has not been 
qualitatively different from the general religious revival among the population after years 
of suppressed religious rights. Thus, the process of Islamic revival was part and parcel of 
the resurgence of the Muslim identity. Nevertheless, the lack of viable religious elite led 
to a necessary secular posture of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms MRF, while in 
Bosnia, SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcie – Party for Democratic Action) had to rely on 
the traditional ulema to vie for success at the elections.  
Still, the scope and scale of it were incomparable to the one in Bosnia. The 
Islamic Institute was opened in Sofia, and three religious high schools were founded in 
cities with large Muslim population (Shumen, Momchilgrad and Kardzali). Courses in 
Islam and Quran have been revived and run by the Mufti. According to different sources, 
there are about 1,150 mosques in the country.160 In the immediate years after 1989 there 
was an initial burst of mosques building resulting in 150 new mosques. At the same time, 
around 1,900 churches were built.161 In addition, the office of Chief Mufti started issuing 
a regular publication in Turkish and in Bulgarian – mjusjulmani (Muslims). Others such 
                                                 
159 Here, I purposefully exclude the Roma (Gipsy) Muslims, as most of their motivations of declaring 
themselves as Muslims stem from financial means. Still, it is important to know that in the past they have 
been subjected to several radical Islamic organizations.  
160 Albena Shkodrova and Iva Roudnikova, “Bulgaria: Investigation. Muslim Infighting Fuels Media 
Fundamentalist Fears” Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) Balkan Crisis Report, No.519, Oct 7, 
2004, 3, http://archiv2.medienhilfe.ch/News/2004/SEE/IWPR519.htm, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
161 Margot Badran, “Finding Islam,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online, no. 552, (September 20 - 26, 2001), 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/552/feature.htm, last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
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as Zaman (Time), a weekly magazine founded in 1992 and said to be close to Fethulah 
Gulen’s neo-confreric movement in Turkey, followed. By contrast, Shahida, a 
publication controlled by el-Fatih ali Hassanein, the director of the European Islamic 
Council, offers a reading of Islam that falls closer to Saudi Wahhabism. Generally, the 
religious literature was easily available over the past decade but was mainly associated 
with foreign Turkish or Arab sources. In this regard, several foreign foundations such as 
Irhsad, Manar, Al-Waqf al-Islami, and World Muslim League, as well as a number of 
Islamic charity organizations (mostly from the Middle East and Iran) established 
themselves on the Bulgarian territory and started disseminating Islamic publications and 
sponsoring local social projects.162 As the state withdrew its support for the Chief Mufti 
Office, these organizations have been providing the necessary funds for the religious 
publications, religious seminars and summer courses. In addition, there has been 
continual growth in the number of Bulgarian Muslims sponsored through these charities, 
NGOs, the Office of the Chief Mufti and even MRF that have been sent to the religious 
schools in the Middle East.163 Such a need was dictated because of the lack of trained 
imams in order to answer the increased interest of the Muslim population to Islam.  
The Islamic revival has been to a certain extent appropriated by the Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms (MRF) due to the political opportunities created by the conscious 
state policy after 1989 of religious and ethnic reconciliation. First of all, as pointed out 
above, an active Islamic resurgence connotes the existence of viable religious elites that 
were not tainted by any previous compromising relations with the communist authorities. 
In this regard, as Ragaru (2001) pointed out, the only elites who were in position to 
harness the general discontent of the humiliating “revival process” and promote the 
Muslim minorities’ rights in the country were the secularized Turks who had been trained 
by the communist regime in the period of 1950 to 1970. In this regard, the minority 
mobilization took place on an ethnic rather than on a religious basis.164 The end effect 
was the emergence of MRF. It is worth noting that the politicization of the minorities 
materialized itself only in the case of the Bulgarian Turks. Several factors contributed to 
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such a process. First of all, the June 1989 protests against communist government 
assimilation politics led to an emigration wave to Turkey of more than 300,000 ethnic 
Turks. Such an exodus had its economic consequences for the state, but on the other 
hand, for the Bulgarian Turks it entailed sale or loss of their real estates. It is unclear 
whether after 1991 Turkey or the U.S. provided strong political or financial back-up for 
the establishment of the new party. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the first post-socialist 
government though pressure to rehabilitate the Turkish minority for the change of their 
names and return of their property still put forward a lot of judicial barriers that 
effectively obstructed such a process. Thus, the social unrest among the Bulgarian Turks 
that started in the 1989 was effectively perpetuated and provided with powerful 
mobilization frames due to inadequate state policy and external pressure. Therefore, it 
naturally started evolving towards the formation of a political party that formally claimed 
to protect every Bulgarian citizens’ rights but actually was pro and in defense of the -
Bulgarian Turks from the outset.  
Although the formation of such a political party has been contested on several 
occasions as the 1991 constitution forbids parties on ethnic or religious basis, the 
emergence of MFR has been very important to both promoting the rights of the Muslim 
minorities and, due to its balancing power in the Bulgarian politics, to the establishment 
of the Bulgarian ethnic model, unlike the developments in Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Kosovo. Still, the state inevitably rendered control to the MFR of the areas of the ethnic 
minorities and did not pursue any coherent economic or social policies in these regions. 
As Marushakova pointed out, “MRF’s organizations exist in every town or village with a 
Turkish or Bulgarian-Muslim population,” and usually they are quite significant for the 
life of these communities (including their local participation in local government).  
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Such a development has been implicitly tolerated by the major political parties 
(with certain exclusions) and the Bulgarian society in general, but did not account for the 
underlying cleavages among the Muslim minorities. As mentioned above, during the 
revival process, the Pomaks were used to occupy administrative posts and to enforce the 
state policy. After 1990, when MRF was registered, the tables turned against the 
Bulgarian-speaking Muslims. The Islamic revival among Pomaks has to be analyzed 
against the background of their relations with the Turkish minority, their position within 
MRF, and their complex group awareness that evolved rather interestingly after the 1989 
democratic changes. As Marushiakova (2001) revealed, the Pomaks’ ethnic affiliation 
depends on the social terrain they thrive in. Basically, they revived and maintained their 
identity in opposition to their neighbors. In the Western Rhodopes where they live with 
Bulgarian Christians, they tend to associate themselves with the Turkish identity. By 
contrast, in the Eastern Rhodopes where they live side by side with the Turkish minority, 
they tend to display a brand of anti—Turkish nationalism.165 
Thus, the support of Bulgarian Muslims for MRF in the Western Rhodopes is the 
strongest. Nevertheless, one has to take into account that their relation with the MRF is 
rather a tenuous one. Until 2001, there had been no access to the leadership positions 
within the movement. The Pomaks also did not have any representation in the Parliament 
until the 2005 elections.166  
Finally, Bulgarian Muslims are equally isolated from both the Bulgaria and 
Turkish state. According to Antoine Roger, there are four factors against which the 
position of ethnic minorities can be evaluated167: internal dynamics, encouragement from 
ethnic “homeland,” behavior towards minorities by the host country, and economic 
relations between the minorities and majority. As pointed out above, MRF has full 
control of the ethnic areas, but at the same time, the economic situation of the Pomaks is 
considerably worse than that of the ethnic Turks. Due to the “big excursion” phenomenon 
in the summer of 1989, more than 300,000 ethnic Turks were allowed to leave the 
country after the demonstrations in May and June the same year. Thus, after the 
democratic changes and new Bulgarian state policy of rehabilitation, most of them either 
returned or sustained their relations with their home state. At the current moment, due to 
the double citizenship that these expatriates have, they constitute a very important “social 
commodity” for the use of Bulgaria as a jumping board for Turkish firms and 
corporations. Since Turkey is still in the beginning of the negotiation process to join EU, 
Bulgaria offers an excellent opportunity for these trade entities to access the EU market. 
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At the same time, Bulgarian passports allow the ethnic Turks free travel in the EU. Thus, 
the situation of the Bulgarian-Muslims against the above mentioned factors seems to be 
almost desperate. On the one side, they have been generally despised and looked upon by 
both Turkish and Bulgarian Christian populations. On the other side, democratic changes 
in the country actually further impoverished them. As one resident of a village in the 
Rhodope Mountains attested, “Before people had jobs but not religious freedom. Now 
they have religious freedom but jobs are scarce.”168  
E. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS  
In line with the above findings, this section tests the working hypotheses of the 
thesis in the case of Islamic revival in Bulgaria. As I showed in the previous sections, this 
phenomenon has to be analyzed in terms of the legacy of the authoritarian rule between 
1944 and 1989, the uneasy relations among the Turks and Bulgarian Muslims on the one 
side and minority-majority interactions on the other, the place of MRF in Bulgarian 
political arena, and the strife economic situation of the Bulgarian Muslim population. 
In this section, I test H1 and H2 in the context of the social terrain of the Pomaks. 
I effectively show that the Islamic revival is an internally (emic) driven phenomenon that 
is part of the process of an evolving group awareness for that minority.  
In terms of the second hypothesis, which presupposes that the observed Islamic 
revival constitutes the initial phase of the emergence of local Islamic movements, this 
thesis argues that the process of social appropriation and non-relational diffusion of 
stricter versions of Islam emanating from the Middle East actually leads to internal 
isolation of the population from the rest of the society and to the emergence of a 
permissive environment for radical Islamic elements to thrive and proselytize Wahhabi 
Islam in these areas. I also warn against the possibility of transformation of the financial 
dependency on Middle East charities and NGOs into an ideological one.  
1. H1: The Process of Islamic Revival is Mainly an Imported 
Phenomenon 
Usually, the process of revival is a mix of local and imported factors. As the 
findings of the Bulgarian case study showed, after 1989 the resurgence of Islam during 
that period restored the link between the Muslim minorities and the rest of the Islamic 
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world. As Ragaru (2001) pointed out, the Islamic revival among the Turkish population 
should be viewed more in terms of reconsiderations of their self-perception and affirming 
their threatened identity.169 What started as a social movement in 1989 that eventually 
led to the “great excursion” and the fall of the incumbent authoritarian regime in Bulgaria 
began losing its steam after 1991, as MRF was able to acquire significant influence on the 
internal political scene. Initially, due to attempts to rehabilitate its historical mistakes and 
to gain supporters in the turmoil of the collapse of the old regime, the new socialist 
government that made the “palace coup” in 1989 needed to show to the rest of the world 
its capability to reform. Thus, all of the contention frames that led to the mass 
demonstrations in 1989 were actually disempowered as the government promptly 
authorized the return of the Turkish names (1990), and then the Parliament voted the 
Public Education Act (1991), as well as the Rules and Regulations for the 
Implementation of the Public Education (1992), and finally the Framework Convention 
on the Protection of National Minorities (1997). To the same effect, as Ragaru pointed 
out, the lack of interethnic violence can be also explained because of the banality of the 
nationalistic rhetoric that has been appropriated by all political parties.170 In addition, 
their relatively stable economic situation due to the retained connections with Turkey 
allowed them to stay aloof of the Muslim missionaries. After the initial boom, most 
specialists typically drew attention to the fact that the resurgence of Islam lost its 
momentum. As Ali Eminov recalls, “by 1995, the number of Muslims who attended the 
Friday prayer had declined considerably.”171  
Nevertheless, as the findings of the case study showed, the revival has different 
developmental and social appropriations for the Bulgarian Muslim minority. It has been 
internally driven as the one witnessed among the Turkish authority, but while the latter 
was just recovering its severed links with the Muslim world and identity, the Pomaks 
have been appropriating the new practices and interpretations of Islam as a tool of 
affirming their identity against the Turkish one. Several field studies by Ragaru (2001),  
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Ghodsee (2005), and Marushakova (2001) indicate that the different version of a stricter 
fundamentalist Islam proselytized by the Arab missionaries allows them to carve their 
own cultural niche. 
Thus, despite the fact that the influx of foreign Islamic NGOs, charities, religious 
schools and financing of the building of new mosques can be viewed as a systemic 
characteristic of the post-communist transition period, nevertheless, the Islamic revival 
among the Pomaks has its internal dynamics and is facilitated by the attempts of that 
minority to reconstruct their identity and distinguish themselves from the ethnic Turks.  
Traditionally, Pomaks have professed a moderate, almost secular version of 
Islam. Still, as Ragaru observed, in the Pomak community Islam was mostly sustained 
through oral transmission and was thus highly enriched by traditional beliefs and 
superstitions. Tradition was meticulously preserved in order to resist the attempts of the 
state control or force assimilation. In addition, as there was no Bulgarian translation of 
the Qur’an, familiarity with Islamic sacred texts was much lower in comparison to the 
Turkish-speaking minority.172 In his interview with anthropologist Ghalina Lozanova, 
Ragaru accounted for the instances when Pomaks asked for religious support from the 
Arab world: “Not long ago, some Pomaks showed me a letter they had sent to an Arab 
mufti asking for some guidance on the way Muslim rites should be performed.”173 
By the same token, the field study done by Ghodsee174 outlines the perceptions 
and aspirations of the Pomaks for the last 15 years. She had very rare insights about the 
perceptions of the Bulgarian Muslims vis-à-vis the ethnic Turks that dovetails with the 
analysis offered in the case study. In most cases, Muslim Turks have been viewed as the 
ones interested in Pomak political support and the ones who want to subjugate Pomaks 
under Turkish leadership. Wahhabism offered them a clear way of distinguishing from 
the Muslim Turks, and at the same time the stricter version of Islam is perceived as a 
marker of superiority over the Turks and as a proof of the close links of the Muslim 
endencies of the Islamic world.  Turks with the contemporary t                                                 
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These issues and perceptions due to the general geographic isolation of the Pomak 
minority hardly penetrated the Bulgarian media and society until 2003 when the power 
struggle for the post of Chief Mufti of Bulgaria raised the issue of the existence of radical 
Islamic centers and religious schools already established and operating among the 
Pomaks. Ensuing media reports175 confirmed the existence of such private schools. Some 
also elaborated on the possible link between Chief Mufti office and the Al—Waqf al-
Islami Saudi foundation. The issue of religious education of young Muslims in the Arab 
world was also brought to the attention of the public. The media also fit in such 
information into the common terrorist threat rhetoric.  
For example, the Bulgarian newspaper “24 Chasa” (24 Hours) claimed it “knew a 
dozen Bulgarian citizens who maintained close ties with the AQ network.” At the same 
time, the private television station bTV, part of Rupert Murdock’s media conglomerate, 
claimed that the Arab community was becoming more active in Bulgaria and that 
emissaries of radical Muslim organizations had been spotted in the country.176 
Despite the fact that the Bulgarian security services played down such reports, the 
issue of Islamic revival has been still left out of the discussion of the spread of radical 
Islam in Bulgaria. The issue in the media has been clouded by the post 9/11 rhetoric that 
“necessarily attached the label ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ to a wide range of Muslim 
beliefs and practices.”177 
The following section attempts to clarify some of the issues and offer an 
anthropological and SMT analysis of the Islamic revival among the Bulgarian Muslims.  
2. H2: The Observed Islamic Revival, Depending on the Characteristics 
of the Social Terrain of Various Balkan States, Constitutes the Initial 
Phase of the Emergence of Local Islamic Movements  
My principal contention here is that H2 is alike H1 fails to be confirmed by the 
developments on the ground. Nevertheless, following the suggested analytical 
framework, I argue that the process of the social appropriation of Wahhabi Islam 
combined with the social terrain changes in the Pomak minority actually provide general 
                                                 




support for the penetration of radical Islam in the country. Nonetheless, the studied 
phenomena actually led to further isolation of the Bulgarian Muslims that might lead in 
the future, along with marginal elements in MRF, to a possible irredentist agenda.  
In comparison to Bosnia, there have been no youth organizations among the 
Bulgarian Muslims that can provide insight of the possible changes in the social terrain. 
Nevertheless, the field studies available account for a similar transformation of traditional 
relations into a more dynamic contention between younger and older generations of 
Muslims. Usually sources of such contention are the returning Muslim students from the 
Middle East and/or the ones that fell under the spell of the religious missionaries. Here, I 
offer a brief analysis of the social dynamics and appropriation of radical Islam among the 
Bulgarian-speaking Muslims.  
Generally, during the communist rule due to the assimilation campaigns, elders 
played an important role in terms of preserving the religious beliefs and keeping family 
memories. As Ragaru (2001) indicated, the age factor seems to play a significant role in 
redefining the relations with the larger Islamic world. It seems that among the old people 
folk, Islam is likely to remain predominant. As most of the Muslims between 50-60 years 
of age were raised during the communism era, they seem to be more secularized than the 
young generation for which religion constitutes a component of the current identity 
strategies.178 As Ghodsee (2005) observed, “there are considerable tensions between 
secular Muslims and the more devout members of their community.”179 Against the fast 
emerging foreign sponsored religious seminars and schools, the more secular Bulgarian 
Pomaks actually use the word “fanatics” to refer to those who have recently become more 
faithful to Islamic traditions from abroad, and there is a fear that these “fanatics” will be 
the cause of renewed oppressions against the Pomaks on the part of the Bulgarian 
government. In addition, she attested to the rising influence of the returning students from 
the Middle East and the continual change of religious practices.180 
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Still, such a social dynamic has gone almost unnoticed for the general Christian 
and even Turkish population. There have been indications of growing tensions between 
the Pomak and Christian minority in the Rhodope that has led to the emergence of a 
radical nationalistic party “Attack.” Still, due to the abdication of the state forming these 
areas, traditional Pomaks are basically left to themselves in terms of countering the 
growing influence of Wahhabi Islam. Nevertheless, the current accounts lack to present 
any cultural frames that might catalyze a further mobilization of contention. Certainly, 
the freshly educated youth, despite gaining influence due to their posts of imams in the 
newly built mosques, still meet considerable resistance from the more traditional 
population. One of the effects witnessed on the ground is the continual isolation of 
Pomaks from the rest of the society. Such a social effect only exacerbates the common 
perception of the Christian population and gives food for thought as it suggests a possible 
emergence of an irredentist movement in the south.  
It is still unclear how the process of the social appropriation of Wahhabi religious 
practices and the emerging contention between young and older Pomaks will develop in 
the future. So far it is clear that until the state fails to come up with adequate policy that 
can solve the economic problems of that minority and discourage radical religious 
education abroad through viable domestic alternatives, the process of Islamic revival can 
only further weaken the more secular part of the population. In addition, in the near and 
mid-term perspective such processes left unattended can be irreversible and can lead to 
the possible emergence of an ethnic Pomak party or parties after the example of MRF. 
Such a perspective could lead to a direct clash with the state as the formation of such a 
party would be in direct violation of the Confessional Act (2002). Such implications will 
be further discussed in Chapter V. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
Among other findings, this case study of Bulgaria shows that the issue of Islamic 
revival has to be analyzed on a case by case basis. I demonstrated that this phenomenon 
has different scope and manifestations depending on the evolution of state-minority 
relations and the ability to utilize the political opportunities after 1991. 
This chapter was able to effectively show that the existence of several Islamic 
minorities inevitably leads to a certain level of competition and self-reinforcing divergent 
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identity constructs. Thus, as the Turkish minority more or less secured its position in the 
Bulgarian society due to the balancing political role of MFR on the political scene, I 
argued that of particular concern are the changes in the social terrain and dynamics in the 
Bulgarian-speaking Muslims.  
My analysis has demonstrated that the Islamic revival among the Pomaks 
necessarily has the characteristics of an internal phenomenon aimed at reinforcing their 
identity and elevating their religious position vis-à-vis the Turks. At the same time, such 
a demand has been maintained by the influx of financial support and missionaries from 
the Middle East. The chapter also showed that like Bosnia, the returning students of 
Islam, and to a certain extent the foreign missionaries, are the spearhead of such a revival.  
At the same time, one of the important findings of this chapter is that unlike the 
case of Bosnia where the majority of the population is Muslim, the IR in Bulgaria does 
not have the dynamics or characteristics of an emerging social movement. It might well 
have started as such in 1989 as a reaction to the state oppression and assimilation process. 
Nevertheless, with the emergence of MFR and the lack of any viable contention frames, 
the IR among the Turks has been manifesting itself along the same lines as the Christian 
or Jewish revival.  
In contrast, the IR among the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, due to their 
geographical isolation, historical legacy, results of state policy, their image and the 
perception they have in the Bulgarian society has taken a rather surprising turn towards 
gradual isolation and reinforcing their differences from the Turkish population. 
Inevitably, such a development connotes the adoption among the younger generations of 







IV.  ISLAMIC REVIVAL VS. GLOBAL SALAFI JIHAD 
In this chapter, I explore the contentious link between Islamic revival and global 
Salafi jihad. First, I briefly elaborate on the inadequacies and fallacy of the current 
analytical frameworks rooted in post-9/11 thought and the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) in relation to the specifics and developments in the Balkans. Building upon the 
findings of the case studies, I use the analytical framework suggested in the first chapter 
in order to investigate the possible relation of the two phenomena in terms of ideological 
and organizational linkages. The issue of the cartoon publications of the Prophet 
Muhammad is used as a litmus test for the viability of certain contention frames and the 
evolution of the Balkan Muslim identity as part of the ummah.  
While such an approach allows me to test the third hypothesis of the thesis which 
posits that there is no casual relationship between the IR and GSJ, on the other hand it 
permits me to further elaborate on the importance of the social appropriation of a radical 
brand of Islam (such as Wahhabism). Though this chapter concludes that there is no 
causal relationship between Islamic Revival and global Salafi jihad, I suggest that the 
existence of organizational and ideological links between the two phenomena in the case 
of Bosnia and Bulgaria leads to the formation of a permissive environment in which 
Islamic extremism has the ability and potential to thrive.  
A. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT SECURITY PARADIGM AND 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS 
For almost 100 years the Balkans have been posing security concerns to the rest 
of the European continent. Due to its location, the region has continuously in the focus of 
the security experts. Nevertheless, both the exogenous and endogenous accounts 
necessarily tackle the security challenges to the Balkans in the framework of post 9/11 
strategic thought and the rhetoric of GWOT. As Michael Innes (2004) observed, the 
military interventions in the former Yugoslavia witnessed a radical shift after 2001. 
“What began in the early 1990s as humanitarian action against state-sponsored repression 
and as protection for non-combatants has since evolved …into a mission heavily 
informed and shaped by global counterterrorism concerns.”181 The implications for the 
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Balkans are significant as Bosnia has started to be perceived first as a terrorist haven and 
then as “gateway for terrorism.”182 In addition, there has been a wave of public concern 
that in certain cases amounted to hysteria as the scope and manifestations of the Islamic 
revival have been associated with the threat of terrorism.183  
Both phenomena, the spread of GSJ and Islamic revival, have been either 
conflated or purposefully used to exploit public sentiment. Alleged Macedonian and 
Serbian security and counterterrorism “experts” tend to use the media in order to pursue 
nationalistic or other goals. In fact, even the common perception among the security 
experts in the West lacks the depth and clarity to address the issue. For example, 
according to a congressional hearing before the Subcommittee on International Relations 
at the House of Representatives on April 6, 2005, in response to a question, addressing 
possible AQ’s recruiting in Bosnia, asked by Mr. Ted Poe to Dr. Bruce Hitchner, the 
latter straightforwardly stated that “There is something called Active Islamic Youth, the 
AIO (Activna Islamska Omladina).184 We don’t know much about this process, but what 
is going on with that has been of some concern to people that deal with the security issue 
side of this issue.”185  
The other analytical extreme that generally suggests an analysis of the Balkans as 
a logistics and financial base as part of the larger phenomenon of “crossover between 
terrorist groups” does not take into consideration the changes in the social terrain in the 
Balkans states and the evolving social relations as shown in the case studies. Indeed, it 
addresses the issue of “operatives” and “supporters” but it does not go further than 
recognizing both categories as “terrorists of the same caliber.”186 At the same time there 
have been considerable efforts to employ social network analysis in order to “map 
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terrorist networks”.187 Valdis Krebs admits the limitations of such an approach restating 
the findings of Sparrow (1991) that incompleteness, fuzzy boundaries and dynamic are 
the three insurmountable problems when dealing with a “terrorist network.”188 Here, I 
suggest the incorporation of SMT and anthropological approaches in order to improve the 
current analysis.  
Thus, the main contention of this chapter is that the mechanistic application of 
such analytical approaches to the Balkans does not take into account the process of 
Islamic revival and/or historic development of the region. Without operationalizing the 
IR and its possible implications to and/or connection with GSJ, the applied governmental 
practices influenced by the EU and U.S. might actually have a blowback effect that 
would only exacerbate and/or escalate the current situation. Thus, the next section 
elaborates on the potential link between the two phenomena and offers indications and 
warnings (I&W) for the mid-term as long as long-term perspective.  
B. TESTING H3  
I posited in the first chapter the third hypothesis that this thesis aims at testing, i.e. 
that there is no casual relationship between IR and GSJ. In order to do that there are 
several clarifications that need to be made from the outset. For the purpose of this section 
I am not going to incorporate in my analysis the general Islamic revival; rather, as 
depicted in the analytical framework in Chapter I, I am more interested in the extreme 
manifestations of this phenomenon that are adrift from the historic path of Islam the local 
population has taken over the centuries. To put it straight I elaborate on Wahhabism both 
as a radical brand of Islam that emanates from salafism which provides religious 
foundation for the GSJ, and as part and parcel of the current IR on the Balkans.  
As Guilain Denoeux pointed out salafism (al-salafiyaa in Arabic) did not develop 
as a monolithic movement but rather as a broad philosophy, a frame of mind. In the past 
two decades, however, one particular brand of salafi ideology, namely Wahhabism, has 
acquired particular success. “What eventually emerged was a particularly puritanical, 
bland, ultra-orthodox and forbidding interpretation of Islam, concerned if not obsessed, 
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with notions of moral corruption and the need for purity.”189 Such an outline presupposes 
a religious (ideological) link between the extreme manifestations of Islamic revival in 
terms of Wahhabism and global Salafi jihad.  
The findings of the case studies presuppose the existence of both – ideological 
and structural conversion of the extreme manifestations of IR (Wahhabi penetration of 
the region) and the spread of GSJ. I explore this possible ideological connection through 
further analysis of the process of social appropriation of radical Islam.  
Second, as shown more in the case of Bosnia than that of Bulgaria, the spread and 
promotion of Wahhabi ideas have been organizationally sustained by ITAN, the 
mujaheed that stayed in Bosnia after 1995 or the foreign missionaries (the latter 
especially in the case of Bulgaria). Thus, I analyze the possible structural convergence of 
IR and GSJ as the same agents have been penetrated by global Salafi movement or used 
as fronts of AQ.  
1. Exploring the Structural Conversion  
The link between the Islamic charities and NGOs, on the one side, and al-Qaeda, 
on the other, has been established already by the law enforcement agencies both in the 
US and in the Balkans. According to a CIA report, of the more than 50 Islamic non-
governmental organizations that existed in 1996, “available information indicates that 
approximately one-third of these Islamic NGOs support terrorist groups or employ 
individuals who are suspected of having terrorist connections.”190 In the case of Bosnia, 
there have been long standing concerns in the European and U.S. intelligence services 
that several charities that operated in Bosnia during and after that country's civil war were 
being used as a cover for Al-Qaeda activities.191 In the spring of 2002, under U.S. 
supervision, Bosnian authorities raided several charities and closed three of them – the al-
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Haramain Islamic Foundation, the Global Relief Foundation and Bosanska Idealna Futura 
(BIF), which is a branch of the Chicago-based Benevolence International Foundation. As 
a result, these entities have been designated as financiers of terrorism under Executive 
Order 13224 and the United Nations added these names to the list of those whose assets 
must be blocked by all member nations under UNSCR 1390.192 In addition to the 
indictments brought against Enaam Arnaout,193 the U.S. transferred six individuals, a.k.a. 
“the Algerian Group,” accused (but acquitted by the Bosnian Supreme Court) of plotting 
of bomb attacks against the U.S. and British embassies in Sarajevo and Guantanamo Base 
in Cuba in 2002. The Algerian Group also showed the role of the High Saudi 
Commission for Relief of appropriating funds for terrorist financing. 
In addition to the material support, Evan Kohlmann (2004) gave an elaborate 
account of the place that Bosnia acquired during the 1992-1995 war as a link between 
AQ leadership based in Afghanistan and the establishment of sleeper cells in Western 
Europe.194 Such a link has been kept active despite the end of the war. Evidence shows 
that the territory of Bosnia had been used by al-Qaeda (and predominantly Maghreb 
Arabs195) as a transit point, logistic support, and/or for planning and coordinating 
purposes for the preparation of the attacks on the USS Cole and French Supertanker 
Limburg, the Embassy bombings, the Millennium plot, the U.S. on September 11, 2001 
and finally the October 2005 plots to bomb the British and U.S. embassy in Sarajevo.196 
In this regard, the International Crisis Group report on al-Qaeda came up with the 
findings that “endemic Balkan problems – inept governance, poor public security, weak 
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rule of law, economic backwardness, corruption and organized crime – produce an 
environment where terrorist networks can hide personnel and money.”197 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that ITAN provided material support to AQ, the 
issue that the same charities and Bin Laden’s affiliates were used as agents to promote 
radical Islamic Salafi teachings has often been ignored. Such research efforts have been 
confined only to the war time period of 1992-1995 when “Al-Qaida has used populist 
dogma clothed in vague and fanciful notions of religious and Islamic history to recruit 
war-scarred, shell-shocked volunteers who have lost all sense of individual identity and 
self-worth.”198 While the issue of whether the Bosnians lost their sense of identity in the 
face of the Serbian and Croat threat is a debatable one, the fact that AQ employed a 
number of prominent clerics such as Imad el-Misri (the religious leader of El-Mujahid 
unit)199 and Shaykh Abu Talal al-Qasimy (a.k.a. Talaat Fouad Qassem) remains a fact on 
the ground.200 As seen in the next section, these individuals were actively involved in 
Salafi preaching and de facto helped Wahhabism establish itself in Bosnia. Such a causal 
link explaining the Islamic Revival taking a definite Wahhabi radical twist due to the 
influx of mujaheed and ITAN in Bosnia is evident in the case of Central Bosnia, namely 
in Zenica, Tishanj, and Bocinja Donja.201  
Still, as evident from the Bosnian case study, the proselytization of radical Islam 
not only continued through the activity of the mujaheed who stayed in Bosnia after the 
war, but also evolved into organized Wahhabi youth organizations such as Active Islamic 
Youth and Young Muslims. Still, my principal contention here is that the structural link 
between GSJ and radical IR, though present on the ground during the war, has been 
considerably weakened to the point of non-existence due to the security measures 
implemented by the Bosnian government especially after 9/11. I claim that such a causal 
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link could have only existed during the war when the mobilization frames for fighting the 
Serbs could be easily conflated with religious radicalism. I suggest that in the case of 
Bosnia we have already witnessed different dynamics that encompass, as outlined above, 
several radical youth organizations with their own constituency and agenda. It has also 
been evident from the Bosnian case study that other radical Middle Eastern organizations 
continually vie for the support of the local populace. Still, we need not lose sight of 
another reality – the availability of what Sageman terms as “links to jihad.” It is unclear 
how the existent local Wahhabi organizations interact or whether there is any such 
relation between them and GSJ operatives. The arrests in October 2005 and recent 
statements by Bosnian officials allude to such contacts. For example, according to 
Sredoje Novic, the director of the Bosnian State Investigation and Protection Agency 
(SIPA) in a series of interviews for the Bosnian newspapers (Glas javnosti daily – 
December 2003, and Nezavisne novine, January 2006) stated that “there are many 
indicators that Bosnia-Herzegovina has retained seed of those prepared to commit many 
terrorist attacks….SIPA needs to investigate the level of radicalization of some forces in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and whether this radicalization is oriented towards eventual terrorist 
actions. There are realistic chances of training of terrorists for certain forms of 
terrorism.”202 
In the case of Bulgaria the structural link is as much in the realm of populist 
political rhetoric as it is on the ground. The lack of any comprehensive field studies 
elaborating on the penetration of radical Islamic organizations or NGOs in the ethnically 
mixed areas is further complicated by the internecine fighting for control over the Chief 
Mufti office. As soon as Bulgaria stood as a strong supporter of the U.S. in the war on 
terror, these infightings necessarily resorted to using terrorist threat rhetoric that has been 
easily picked up by the media and raved up by the general Bulgarian public. Still, though 
more or less the public concerns for the past several years combined with the balancing 
role of MRF in Bulgarian politics led to the emergence of an outright nationalistic party 
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such as “Attack” in the 2005 Parliamentary elections, the media accounts differ from the 
ones provided by the security services.  
The general perception is that Bulgarian Muslims “may be in contact with foreign 
organizations which are more conservative than the majority of local believers are 
familiar with, but it does not mean that the Wahhabi faith or other fundamentalist 
denominations are spreading in the country.”203 Thus far, several foundations have been 
implicated as posing danger to the national security of the country, among them Al-Waqf 
al Islami, which provides funding for new mosques and Muslim schools, and Taiba, as its 
director Abdullah Mohamed was expelled form Bulgaria in 1998. Still, reports are to an 
extent contradictory as the rhetoric that is used is misleading and mainly centered around 
GWOT. Ex-chief secretary of the Ministry of Interior pointed out several times that the 
police “had launched two or three operations against Muslim missionaries at Velingrad 
and Pazardzik in the south”204 Such steps were allegedly taken in order to “prevent 
terrorist groups gaining a foothold in Bulgaria.”205  
2. Exploring the Religious Connection 
The major finding of the presented case studies put forward the continuous social 
appropriation of Salafi Islam and specifically its Wahhabi brand. In this section, I 
elaborate on how such a process relates to the three general steps of joining jihad as 
identified by Marc Sageman – social affiliation, intensification of beliefs and 
encountering a link to jihad.  
As I posited in the first chapter, for the purpose of this thesis I take Marc 
Sageman’s and Jason Burke’s definition206 of GSJ as an Islamic revivalist social 
movement. Certainly, this thesis accounts for what Sageman (2004) terms as 
“fundamental issue of specificity”207 and, in addition, takes into consideration that his 
study looks more at the social settings relevant to the West than the ones predominant in 
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the Balkans. In this respect, against his conclusions, I incorporate the findings of the case 
studies that deal with the changes of the social terrain. Several issues need to be outlined 
as general characteristics of the process of joining GSJ that I will later correlate to the 
process of Islamic revival.  
First, there is the religious and social dimension of joining jihad. Sageman 
concludes that the latter is far more important than the former as “social bonds are the 
critical element in the process and precede ideological commitment.”208 Second, the lack 
of resources invested in any recruitment drive is an issue. Sageman’s testimony that he 
“did not detect any active top-down organizational push to increase al Qaeda’s 
membership”209 was confirmed by Jason Burke’s (2004) findings. Burke elaborated on 
the third phase of the evolution of AQ during which “the ‘hardcore’ is scattered, the 
‘network of networks’ broken up. All that remains is the idea of ‘al-Qaeda’. You are a 
member of al-Qaeda if you say you are.”210 Such a conclusion elevates the importance of 
the bottom-up recruitment and the “links to jihad.” The third issue is the importance of 
embeddedness and cliques as part of the social networking and jihad. The first term refers 
to the rich nexus of social and economic linkages between the members of an 
organization and environment. The latter brings to the forefront the importance of small 
tightly-knit groups.211 
Despite the sources of Islamic revival in the Balkans, whether externally or 
internally driven, the case studies concluded that despite the fact that both processes of IR 
in Bosnia and Bulgaria fell short of having the dynamics and depth of a full-fledged 
social movements, nevertheless they share one common characteristic according to Doug 
McAdam’s analytical framework, and that is the continual social appropriation of Salafi 
ideas. Such social appropriation has been developing through relational (using the 
described above structural agents) and non-relational diffusion of ideas. As a matter of 
fact, the increased proselytization and spread of Wahhabism has been one of the major 
characteristics of the IR in Bosnia (especially through the youth organizations in the 
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central parts of the country) and to a lesser extent in Bulgaria. Yet, many Muslims share 
Salafi (Wahhabi) beliefs but stop short of preaching extremism or employing violence. 
Here, I suggest that we should be very careful in drawing any preliminary conclusions 
out of the evident spread of Wahhabism as there is a danger of falling into the common 
fallacy of lumping together the peaceful Wahhabi praying in the King Fahd mosque in 
Sarajevo and the mujahedin plotting to blow the British or US embassy in Sarajevo.212 
Sageman also warned against the use of an ideological appeal thesis outlined above. Such 
a thesis implies that people would randomly join the movement simply by being exposed 
to its ideology. The stronger the exposure the greater the recruitment would be. 
Nevertheless, as Sageman pointed out, “historically, joining AQ was definitely not a 
random process. One of its surprising features was its complete failure to recruit members 
where its headquarters and training camps were located….Therefore the bonds of terror 
did not form spontaneously by mere exposure as implied in the mass ideological appeal 
thesis.”213  
In the same vein, the existence of a structural link between IR and GSJ does not 
necessarily presuppose an ideological one. Still, the question remains – how should the 
social appropriation be interpreted, especially if one tries to provide for a mid- or long-
term analysis? It seems that in the Bulgarian case, the competitive environment created 
by several minorities accounts for such an appropriation while, at the same time, the 
availability of a “link to jihad” (as termed by Sageman) has not sufficiently been proved. 
Nevertheless, bearing in mind the lack of top-down recruitment and the established 
existence of links of jihad, the Bosnian case raises some eyebrows. Most probably, based 
on the available data, the scrupulous desk officer or analyst would conclude that the 
social appropriation of Salafi ideas plus the active involvement of 1992-1995 war-
veterans in creating and sustaining Wahhabi youth organizations equals to a fertile 
ground for jihadi recruitment not to mention the existing mosque-network and ITAN in 
the country. Such a proposition does not seem to be far away from reality, as it is evident 
that CIA’s analysis and operations most probably have been following the outlined 
rationale. For example, the agency sent in September 2003 Abdurahman Khadr to Bosnia 
                                                 
212 Here, I refer to the October and November, 2005 arrests in Bosnia, Denmark and Sweden.  
213 Sageman, 119. 
84 
in order to blend in with the transient Muslim population, attend the King Fahd mosque, 
and then to go to Iraq with AQ forces.214 Still, there has not been any confirmed data of 
AQ recruiting local Bosnians, or at least not in the available open sources. The 
availability of structural agents of GSJ and the lack of local recruitment, despite the 
fertile ground that Wahhabi ideas are getting among some segments of the population 
mainly in central Bosnia, seems to be in initial contrast with Sageman’s findings. I 
suggest that in order to explain such a reality in the region, the issues of embeddedness 
and social cliques suggested by Sageman have to be turned around and analyzed in the 
context of the Balkans.  
Sageman interprets embeddedness in terms of “social and economic linkages 
between the members of an organization.”215 Viewing his sample of jihadists, he 
concluded that because they were not embedded into the Western societies and lacked the 
social bonds that tied them to the local people, thus they were freed from responsibilities 
and local concerns. Sageman even argued that such an absence of connection is “a 
necessary condition for a network of people to join the GSJ.”216 Here, I argue that in the 
case of the Balkans, the issue of embeddedness should be considered the other way 
around. Thus, the dichotomy in the above case studies between states with a majority and 
minority of Muslim population actually comes into an important play. In the case of 
Bosnia the existence of Muslims as a majority, combined with the influx of ITAN during 
the 1992-1995 war and the infiltration of AQ in the central part of Bosnia, provided for 
the high degree of embeddedness of the GSJ network in the local social terrain. The 
organizational chart presented by Kohlmann (2003) showing the dispersion of Bosnia 
mujahedeen and their participation in several terrorist plots in Europe and North Africa 
actually shows only one side of the phenomena. The convergent line of GSJ and IR is 
evident in the case of Imad el-Misri and radical returning students of Islam from the Arab 
countries. I showed in the Bosnian case study how these structural agents were actually 
instrumental in the changes in social terrain and the social appropriation of Salafi ideas. 
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Thus, my main contention here is that the structural and, to a certain extent ideological 
convergence between IR and GSJ in the case of Bosnia, should not be viewed necessarily 
as a breeding ground for recruitment, but rather as a permissive environment in which the 
phenomenon of GSJ thrives. The notion of a permissive environment is tied to the moral 
and most probably material support similar to the support that Ratko Mladic and Radovan 
Karadzic receive in Republika Srpska. I also argue that in concentrating too much on 
finding causal linkages between these two phenomena, most of the analytical accounts 
miss the evolution of IR and its possible potential for growing into a viable Islamic social 
movement which scope and scale are hard to predict. I would also suggest that most 
probably among some segments of the Bosnian Muslim population, the resurgence of 
Islam was tied unequivocally with the adherence to radical Salafi ideas close to the 
ideology of GSJ. For example, between 1992 and 1995, more than two thousand 
Bosniaks went through a forty days of religious training as a precondition for admittance 
into the el-Mujahid brigade. Whether they fought so that they could pursue a nationalist 
agenda or GSJ is an arguable issue, as in the second chapter I showed that it was mainly 
the former rather than the latter. Nevertheless, one should not lose sight of the continual 
existence and growth of Salafi youth organizations long after the war. In addition, the 
thesis of brewing social movement dynamics is supported by the growing contention 
against the official Islamska zajednica. Of particular interest is whether the degree of 
separation between IR and GSJ is the lack of viable mutual contention frames. Most of 
these contention frames outlined in the second chapter and viewed in regard to the IR and 
its potential as a SM are actually more nationalistic rather than religious-based. While 
answering such a question goes beyond the scope of this thesis, the reaction to the 
cartoon publication in Bosnia showed if nothing else the increased association of the 
Bosnians with the global Muslim agenda. On the other hand, the repetitive statements of 
Bosnian Chief Mufti that call for the process of “institutionalization of Islam in 
Europe"217 deserve further attention and will be discussed in the next chapter.  
The case of Bulgaria is quite different from that of Bosnia. As shown in the 
previous section and in the third chapter, it is hard to find any structural link to GSJ 
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except for several foundations as Taiba (the same one that operated in Bosnia) and some 
expelled individuals. Still, as the case study indicated, of particular concern is the 
Bulgarian-speaking Muslim minority for whom the appropriation of Salafi social 
practices and ideology is viewed as an identity multiplier against the Turkish minority. 
Here, it is hard to discuss the issue of embeddedness because of the lack of an adequate 
structural link to GSJ. Nevertheless, it is worth analyzing the possible implications of an 
IR with such a Salafi ideological twist. The end results have been the further isolation of 
that minority from the rest of the population. Such isolation also raises concerns as the 
intensification of certain beliefs and practices provides fertile ground for Arab 
missionaries. Still, though these beliefs and practices seem to be close to Salafism, it is 
not quite clear to what extent they are accepted in the depth and content that a Wahhabi 
embraces them. I posit here that of particular interest are the retuning students of Islam 
from the Middle East. Though there has not been relevant research or field studies in this 
area, I posit here that their social activity and the circles that they create might be close to 
the characteristics to what Sageman defines as cliques. Their intense networking with the 
youths and sometimes open confrontation with the elders suggest that they are potential 
structural drivers of the current IR. What is unclear is to what extent, such a change of the 
social terrain makes it susceptible to jihadi influence or possible recruitment. Emblematic 
is the fact that the cartoon issue did not resonate with this minority in Bulgaria. Actually, 
it spurred demonstrations by the growing Arab population in the capital.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The current chapter explored the possible structural and ideological links between 
GSJ and Islamic revival on the Balkans. My analysis has demonstrated that there has 
been a convergence of the two phenomena during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia as the 
agents of GSJ that gained access in the central part of the country also proselytized 
radical Salfi jihad among the local populace. Nevertheless, I was able to show that though 
such links have been considerable weakened after the war, the continual appropriation of 
the Wahhabi brand of Islam has acquired its own momentum, propelled by the 
indigenous Bosnian youth organizations – AIY and Young Muslims. Still, as the Islamic 
revival and GSJ are current on-going phenomena it is unclear to what extent the spread of 
the Salafi version of Islam in Bosnia connotes any ideological facilitation or link to GSJ.  
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While such indications and warnings have to be monitored and timely analyzed, 
one of the principal findings of the chapter is that the changes the above structural agents 
introduced to the social terrain in Bosnia and Bulgaria vary depending on either the 
relation among the different Muslim minorities (as in the case of Bulgaria) or the 
continual appropriation of radical Islam through indigenous youth organizations. While 
the chapter was not able to establish a present causal relation between GSJ and IR, I 
argued for the importance of other factors on the ground. Thus, the suggested dichotomy 
between states with a majority and minority of Muslim population provides one way of 
augmenting and interpreting different issues such as embeddedness and social cliques.  
In the case of Bosnia, I suggested that the consequences of the structural, and to a 
certain extent ideological conversion of GSJ and IR during the 1992-1995 war, should 
not be viewed necessarily as a breeding ground for recruitment, but rather as a permissive 
environment in which the phenomena of GSJ thrives. The chapter concluded that such a 
permissive environment has to be viewed both as moral and probably material support of 
the radical Islamism. On the other hand, I warned against continual conflation of the 
process of IR and GSJ as the current U.S. GWOT strategy was skewed in the Balkan 
settings and led to heightened public fears. In addition, the chapter argued for the need of 
a qualitatively different analytical approach to the developments on the ground as the 
potential of the emergence of Islamic movements in Bosnia deserves further 
investigation. In the case of Bulgaria, I suggested an analysis in which the emergence of 
radical social circles and cliques218 occupies center stage. In addition, this chapter also 
warned against the possible transformation of Bulgarian Muslims’ financial dependence 
into ideological influence or dependence.  
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V.  CONCLUSIONS 
A.  OVERVIEW 
The Balkans has been a central arena where ongoing trends and phenomena in 
Europe and the Middle East have interacted and manifested themselves in ways that have 
had far-reaching effects. For the last 15 years, the Balkans has been subjected to two 
phenomena which raised particular concerns and public debates, namely Islamic Revival 
(IR) and global Salafi jihad (GSJ). The events of the last several years show the potential 
and dynamism of both processes as Hamas’ electoral victory and the London attack 
(07/07/2005) are two of the most recent highlights of the opposite sides of the larger 
phenomenon of Islamic activism. As far as these processes are still continuing, it is very 
hard to either construct a comprehensive analytical framework that encompasses all their 
manifestations and implications or develop adaptive and responsive policy guidelines that 
address them in depth. Though for the most part current research and analyses either 
conflate or one-sidedly approach these phenomena, they unequivocally show that Balkan 
Islam, which includes communities of differing histories and customs, is under the 
increasing pressure of Islamic radicalism.  
Thus, the main research question that this thesis purported to answer is whether 
the current process of Islamic revival in the Balkans poses a security threat to the region 
in the context of the rise of global Salafi jihad. In order to contextualize the above stated 
question, this thesis deconstructed it into two subsidiary research questions which 
connoted a relevant set of indications and warnings along with adequate security and 
policy countermeasures - (a) does IR constitute the initial phase of the emergence of 
Islamic social movement dynamics on the ground, and (b) is there a causal relationship or 
other type of connection between the Islamic revival on the Balkans and the spread of 
global Salafi jihad? 
In an attempt to answer the above stated questions, I suggested operationalizing 
the Islamic revival in the Balkans through an assessment of the validity of three working 
hypotheses that exemplify a three-step analytical approach based on comparative case 
studies. First, the process of Islamic revival is mainly an imported (edic) phenomenon. 
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Second, the observed Islamic revival, depending on the characteristics of the social 
terrain in the different Balkan states, constitutes the initial phase of the emergence of 
local Islamic movements. Third, there is no causal relationship between the Islamic 
revival and global Salafi jihad. 
In order to evaluate them against the findings on the ground, this study also adds 
on to the current academic and security discussion in several ways. First, it raises the 
issue of the possible interdependence of the Islamic Revival and global Salafi jihad. 
Second, it offers a comprehensive analytical framework using an interdisciplinary 
approach centered around the social movement theory that allows for the interpretation of 
the Islamic revival in the context of the broader phenomena of Islamic activism. In 
addition, this work not only highlights the unique characteristics and social terrain of the 
Balkans in difference to the rest of the European continent, but also argues for a 
differentiated case-by-case analytical approach. In this respect, this thesis suggested 
dichotomy between Balkan states with a comparative majority and Balkan states with a 
comparative minority of Muslim population. Finally, based on the suggested analytical 
framework, I offered a comprehensive analysis of the possible structural and ideological 
convergence of the Islamic Revival and global Salafi jihad on the Balkans in order to 
clarify any probable causal relation between the two and further took stock of the 
possible future evolution of these phenomena.  
B.  ASSESSING THE HYPOTHESES 
The validity of the suggested hypotheses was assessed through the use of 
comparative case study methodology operationalizing the Islamic revival in accordance 
with the specifics of the local social terrain. Such an approach allowed for the various 
manifestations of the research phenomena to be contextualized in terms of the inter-
minority relations and the social-cultural memories of the target societies of the Balkans. 
Thus, the suggested dichotomy between states with a relevant majority and minority of 
Muslim population turned out to be a useful starting point for the implementation of the 
suggested at the outset analytical framework.  
1. Hypotheses #1 and #2 
The process of Islamic revival in the case of Bosnia and Bulgaria, though having 
different roots, underlying causes and dynamics, initially started as an indigenous 
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phenomenon. Nevertheless, as both case studies attested to, for the last 15 years it ended 
up being ideologically sustained (by either foreign emissaries and/or returning students of 
Islam) and financially supported by Middle Eastern (predominantly Saudi Arabian) 
charities. In addition, in both states the incumbent Chief Mufti offices have been 
challenged by the increasing numbers of religious NGOs, thus effectively turning the 
Balkans into a contested area between radical and moderate Islam. Despite these common 
features, in each of the cases the current internal dynamics and moving forces of such 
revival are qualitatively and quantitatively different. In the case of Bosnia, I showed that 
the current dynamism of the Islamic revival, though lacking viable contemporary 
mobilization frames, nevertheless thematically has the characteristics and dynamics of an 
emerging social movement. In the spearhead of such process are the Islamic youth 
Wahhabi organizations such as AIY or even the more moderate ones like “Young 
Muslims” (the youth political organization of SDA). Such developments are not only 
emblematic for the central part of Bosnia which has been mostly exposed to the 
continuous ideological influence of the foreign mujahidin, but also spread to the rest of 
the country. The recent demonstrations in Sarajevo against the publications of cartoons of 
the Prophet Muhammad provide an interesting case of the Bosnian Muslims mobilized by 
contentious frames which are common for the rest of the Muslim world. 
The case of Bulgaria raises some concerns, as the underlying rivalry between the 
Bulgarian Muslims and Bulgarian Turk minorities led to the continuous isolation of the 
former. Though Bulgarian Muslims are relying on external financial support, the Islamic 
revival among the Pomaks has the characteristics of an internal phenomenon aimed at 
reinforcing their identity and elevating their position vis-à-vis the Turks. As Georgi 
Krastev of the state religious directorate confirmed, “wahhabi views may well be 
spreading in Bulgaria.”219 Still, the Bulgarian case poses more questions as to what the 
real situation on the ground is due to the continual conscious separation of the Bulgarian 
Muslims from the other Muslim minorities, on the one side, and from the Bulgarian 
society as a whole, on the other.  
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2. Hypothesis #3 
Through the assessment of the third hypothesis, this thesis explored the 
contentious link between IR and GSJ. Its main conclusion is that though there has been a 
convergence of the two phenomena in the case of BiH during the 1992-1995 war, the 
existence of possible structural and ideological links between IR and GSJ is questionable 
and requires further research. Nevertheless, the presented findings raise concerns not 
because of the lack of direct relation or a causal relationship between the two phenomena, 
but rather because of the non-relational diffusion that such coexistence has produced. 
This thesis offers a somewhat different analysis and perspective of the issues on the 
ground. It suggested that due to the historic conversion of the two phenomena, a major 
characteristic of the social terrain in both states is the emergence of a permissive 
environment in which GSJ has the potential to thrive. Such a permissive environment has 
to be viewed as both moral and most probably material support for GSJ. The October 
2005 arrests in Bosnia, Denmark and Sweden showed the real potential of such a non-
relational link. 
In the case of Bulgaria, the relation between the two phenomena has not been 
well-established nor has it been objectively debated in the public space. In any case the 
continual rift among the Muslim leadership of the country along with the persistent 
financial foreign support and the increasing prominence of the Middle Eastern educated 
Islamic students raises considerable concerns. The latter involve the possible emergence 
of autonomy seeking groups and/or the evolution of financial dependency on Saudi 
charities into an ideological one. 
The principal conclusion of this thesis is that whether the Islamic revival in the 
Balkans entails new security challenges and/or constitutes a security threat to the region 
mainly depends on the way Balkan governments are handling this phenomenon in times 
when the region is under the pressure of radical Islam and a vantage point for jihadi 
operations in Europe. The current policies of the Balkan governments are firmly 
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grounded in the American understanding and approach of fighting the GWOT.220 In 
addition, the 9/11 Commission Report identified European cities with expatriate Muslim 
communities, especially in central and Eastern Europe, as one of the six primary areas 
that do or could serve as terrorist sanctuaries.221 Furthermore, being under the pressure of 
fulfilling their obligations as part of the “coalition against terror,” Bulgaria, Romania, 
Bosnia, and Albania necessarily adopted most of the U.S. rhetoric and policy. The fact 
that they are part of that coalition raises the fears of the public that these states can 
become targets of the GSJ because of their support for the operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. As a result, instead of relevant governmental policies addressing the issue of 
Islamic revival and disentangling it from the phenomenon of GSJ, Balkan states adopted 
security policies that can be boiled down to stringent security measures and border 
control that prevents any suspected terrorist from using the Balkans as a transit point to 
Western Europe. The principal contention of this thesis is that such policies sooner or 
later are doomed to fail as they does not take into account the indigenous process of the 
Islamic revival among the local Muslim population that has already acquired its own 
dynamics and momentum. The October 2005 arrests in Sarajevo, the seizing of caches of 
explosives and the rumors of renewed activities of training camps in Central Bosnia 
constitute a chilling reminder that the future security problems of the Balkans most 
probably will not only emanate from being a transit point between the Middle East and 
Europe, but also form the internal dynamics of the Islamic revival. 
Nevertheless, even among the local Muslim communities and Mufti offices, there 
seems to be a lack of strong resolution to counter radical Islam. The registration of 
Muslim Brotherhood’s offshoot in 2002 in Bosnia and the challenges that the Chief Mufti 
Mustafa Ceric has been facing due to the influx of Middle Eastern religious organizations 
did not spur any reaction from the Islamic Community in Bosnia. Instead, Mustafa Ceric 
                                                 
220 For an excellent paper on these issues see Gyorgy Lederer, “Countering Islamic Radicals in 
Eastern Europe,” discussion paper prepared for the Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of 
the United Kingdom, September 30, 2005, 
http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/Special/csrc_mpf.2005-10-17.5799702381/WP-CIST-CEE2.pdf, 
last accessed on October 13, 2005. 
221 Francis T. Miko, Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission Recommendations and 
the U.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 
(February 11, 2005), p. 3. 
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came up with the initiative of “institutionalization of Islam in Europe”222 which in 
essence is an admirable idea but only conflates the Islamic problem that Bosnia is facing 
with the ones that Europe is enduring. It leaves out the question of what kind of Islam 
should be institutionalized in Europe, as the radical Islamic organizations are already 
challenging the Bosnian Chief Mufti position of the sole representative of the Muslim 
community in the country. The problems in Bulgaria, though of a different nature, are 
still hovering around the rivaling factions aspiring for control of the Mufti office. Such a 
rivalry deviates a lot of resources and public attention, and necessarily demonizes the 
Islamic revival and conflates it with the thereat of Islamic terrorism. 
C.  AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
Despite the fact that we witness these contemporary phenomena and not 
necessarily have the benefit of the hindsight, it is imperative that the issues the thesis 
dealt with continue to be researched and analyzed. In the light of the findings of this 
work, there are several areas of future research which I arrange below in terms of their 
urgency and importance.  
I believe that a good starting point for further discussion of the issue of Islamic 
revival is that thematically and analytically it should not be dominated by the current 
GWOT analytical frameworks. Though it is implicitly linked to the spread of GSJ, IR 
poses qualitatively different policy and security challenges that if not timely applied can 
lead to convergence of the two phenomena. In this regard, there is a need for 
comprehensive field studies among the Salafi-dominated central regions of Bosnia and 
the Bulgarian Muslim-populated southern parts of Bulgaria. In addition, as the current IR 
is mainly sustained through the returning students of Islam and Arab charities, it is 
important to further investigate the linkages between the former and the radical circles in 
the host countries. Of particular importance is to clarify what could be the potential 
frames that could mobilize the Salafi-dominated regions in Bosnia and turn them either to 
a viable social Islamic movement or to a recruiting base for GSJ. In the case of Bulgaria 
of immediate concern is whether the current financial dependence of the Bulgarian 
Muslim can evolve into an ideological one. In this regard, the planned field studies for 
the summer of 2006 among the minority by Christy Ghodsee may clarify this question.  
                                                 
222 “Bosnia Mufti Says EU and European Muslims Must Work Together.” 
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Another area that draws attention is the increasing number of Arab immigrants in 
the main cities of the Balkan states. Despite the considerable challenges involved, 
researching their future role, possible connections, and/or impact on the local Muslim 
population would provide further insights of the evolution of Islamic revival and GSJ. In 
the long term, my belief is that future research should incorporate governmental and 
security experts in order to come up with a comprehensive strategy to counter the 
possible convergence of IR and GSJ and empower the moderate part of the local 
Muslims. Of particular interest are the suggestions made by Gyorgy Lederer in 2005.223 
Though they were discarded at the outset by the EU,224 I contend that the realities and 
developments on the ground have shown that academia and security experts are already 
behind the power curve in following both phenomena.  
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